On the morning of 9 October 2026, heavy fighting broke out between the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Sahel (IS-S) near Tessit, close to the border with Burkina Faso. Each side claims the other was routed. Those competing accounts cannot settle who actually won. What they do reveal is a stubborn fact: armed groups are still battling for ground in the Sahel, and civilians are still paying the price in displacement, insecurity and disrupted lives.
Why the Tessit clashes matter beyond the battlefield
The clashes have reignited a debate that the military governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger grouped in the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) would rather avoid. Since taking power, these juntas have built their legitimacy on two promises: restoring sovereignty and defeating terrorism. Yet the ability of armed groups to move, organise and fight one another on the very territory the AES claims to be securing raises uncomfortable questions about the effectiveness of those strategies.
The core problem is not simply that terrorist groups exist. It is that states have struggled for years to stop them from putting down roots. Tessit is a case in point: while JNIM and IS-S contest positions, local populations continue to endure insecurity that repeated pledges of order have not removed.
AES authorities regularly denounce foreign interference, at times accusing neighbouring countries of facilitating armed groups or allowing their fighters to use rear bases. Such claims need verifiable evidence. The presence of terrorist groups on a country’s soil does not, by itself, prove that its leaders willingly support or host them.
Still, one question is unavoidable: how can military governments justify their security record when armed groups keep operating in areas where the state struggles to restore lasting authority?
Sovereignty rhetoric versus conditions on the ground
For the Sahel’s military regimes, the challenge now is to show that their strategic choices deliver concrete results. Switching military partners, expelling Western forces and drawing closer to Russia were all presented as ways to regain control of security.
Those shifts alone, however, do not eliminate armed groups. Persistent difficulties in Mali and violence across different Sahel regions show that counterterrorism also depends on intelligence, an effective administrative presence, civilian protection and the ability of security forces to hold recaptured territory.
A United Nations report released in 2026 described sustained activity by JNIM and Islamic State in the Sahel, particularly around Tessit and Ménaka in Mali, as well as in parts of Niger and Burkina Faso. It also noted clashes between the two organisations over territorial control.
That reality weakens narratives that blame security failures exclusively on outside manoeuvres. Regional and cross-border factors are real, but they do not exempt any government from accounting for its own results.
The political stakes: insecurity and staying in power
Managing the terrorist threat also raises a broader political question: how to prevent persistent insecurity from becoming a permanent argument for concentrating power and delaying a return to normal constitutional order?
It would be reckless to assert without evidence that AES leaders willingly host or feed terrorist groups in order to stay in power. Such an accusation requires concrete, independent and verifiable proof.
It is legitimate, however, to examine the political consequences of a situation in which the security threat remains omnipresent while military authorities keep citing counterterrorism as a major justification for their rule.
The distinction matters: pointing to the possible political exploitation of insecurity is not the same as claiming leaders themselves engineer that insecurity. The first is political analysis; the second demands evidence.
What people want is results, not explanations
At Tessit, the opposing claims from JNIM and Islamic State do not yet establish which group prevailed on 9 October. But that uncertainty does not change the main issue: both organisations can still mount operations and contest control of certain areas.
For residents, the consequences are tangible. Insecurity restricts movement, disrupts economic activity and complicates access to essential services. Talk of sovereignty, international alliances and external enemies cannot permanently substitute for measurable results on the ground.
The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger thus face a straightforward demand: demonstrate the ability to protect populations, prevent armed groups from entrenching themselves and restore an effective public presence in affected areas.
Sovereignty is not measured only by the partners a state chooses or the foreign forces it expels. It is also measured by a state’s capacity to protect its citizens on its own territory.
As long as armed groups keep contesting territory in the Sahel, AES authorities will have to answer a simple question: beyond rhetoric and accusations aimed abroad, what durable results can they show to guarantee people’s safety?
By Martin Ngu — Journaliste / Rédacteur