In 2025, the Sahel region of West Africa faced an alarming escalation in militant activity, with armed groups expanding their operations beyond traditional strongholds. This shift has intensified economic warfare tactics, disrupting regional stability and challenging the authority of military-led governments in countries including Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Benin, and Nigeria.
militant groups expand operations with economic warfare tactics
Two prominent militant organizations, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), have significantly broadened their influence across the central Sahel. Beyond consolidating control in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, these groups have extended their reach into coastal West African nations, particularly along the borders of Benin, Niger, and Nigeria.
Economic warfare has become a cornerstone of their strategy, aimed at undermining state authority and destabilizing the region. In Mali, JNIM imposed a sweeping embargo on fuel and transportation in cities such as Kayes and Nioro du Sahel, disrupting trade routes between Bamako and surrounding regions. The blockade triggered severe fuel shortages and price surges nationwide, exacerbating economic hardship and eroding public trust in the government. Violence in Kayes, Sikasso, and Segou surged to unprecedented levels, reaching the highest monthly figures since data collection began in 1997.
In Burkina Faso, JNIM continued its offensives against both the military and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP). The group briefly seized control of provincial capitals like Djibo and Diapaga in May, followed by a devastating ambush on a military convoy near Koubel-Alpha in Soum Province in September, resulting in the deaths of approximately 90 soldiers. These advances underscore JNIM’s growing military capabilities and its intent to challenge state control through sustained attacks on infrastructure and security forces.
While Niger has not experienced the same intensity of violence, the country faces increasing vulnerability as militant activity spreads to southern regions such as Dosso and northern Agadez. ISSP has intensified attacks on critical infrastructure, including the Benin-Niger oil pipeline, targeting regional economic stability. The kidnapping of a U.S. citizen in Niamey on October 21 highlighted the expanding reach of militants into previously secure urban centers.
kidnapping campaigns target foreign nationals as economic leverage
Both JNIM and ISSP have launched kidnapping campaigns targeting foreigners, driving record-high abduction rates in Mali and Niger. JNIM primarily targeted foreign workers at industrial sites, mining operations, and transit routes, while ISSP expanded its operations to include Western nationals and foreign laborers, with most incidents occurring in Niger. These abductions serve as both a revenue stream and a tool for exerting pressure on governments and international actors. ACLED data also records additional incidents in border areas of Burkina Faso and Algeria.
The Islamic State Sahel Province’s strategy marks a shift toward high-value hostage-taking, often outsourcing abductions to criminal networks. This evolution reflects a broader trend of militant groups leveraging economic disruptions and human insecurity to achieve strategic objectives.
coastal west africa emerges as a new frontline for militant expansion
One of the most significant developments in 2025 has been the consolidation of a new conflict frontline in the tri-border region of Benin, Niger, and Nigeria. This area has become strategically vital for both Sahelian and Nigerian militant factions, facilitating the merging of previously distinct conflict zones into a single, interconnected theater of operations.
Throughout the year, JNIM and ISSP deepened their presence in this region, transforming it into a critical flashpoint with implications for both the Sahel and coastal West Africa. Northern Benin experienced its deadliest year on record as JNIM intensified cross-border operations from eastern Burkina Faso, culminating in the killing of over 50 soldiers in Park W. By mid-2025, the group had advanced further south into the Borgou Department, near the border with Nigeria, signaling a southward expansion beyond its traditional northern strongholds. JNIM also claimed its first attack in Nigeria in late October.
Meanwhile, ISSP reinforced its foothold in southwestern Niger, moving closer to Gaya on the border with Benin, and continued operations in Nigeria’s Sokoto and Kebbi states. In the Niger-Nigeria border areas, the group targeted villages, security posts, and critical infrastructure, further destabilizing regional security. Both Sahelian groups have now established a presence in northwestern and western Nigeria, signaling a convergence of conflict dynamics across the subregion.
This growing overlap between Sahelian and Nigerian militant factions represents a turning point, as previously distinct conflict zones merge into a single, interconnected environment stretching from Mali to western Nigeria. In 2026, this region is poised to become a key arena of competition among militant groups, including JNIM, ISSP, Ansaru, Mahmuda, factions of the Islamic State West Africa Province, and various bandit groups. As these factions increasingly operate in shared spaces, new patterns of violence and collaboration are likely to emerge.
military regimes face mounting pressure amid declining state control
The escalation of militant activity has placed immense strain on military-led governments in the central Sahel. In Mali, the fuel and transport embargo imposed by JNIM has crippled the economy, disrupted the movement of goods and people, and intensified civilian hardship. The prolonged disruption risks deepening fractures within the armed forces and fueling unrest that the ruling junta may struggle to contain.
Burkina Faso faces similar challenges, with the army and VDP overstretched after years of attrition. JNIM’s ability to temporarily seize major towns underscores the group’s strategic evolution and its potential to target regional capitals such as Fada N’Gourma. Continued heavy military casualties and territorial losses could generate internal dissent and coup pressures, mirroring the instability that has toppled previous governments.
Across the central Sahel, state authority is steadily eroding despite junta pledges to restore security. JNIM and ISSP now contest sovereignty over vast rural territories, where they enforce alternative governance structures, tax populations, and control access to livelihoods. Their influence is encroaching on major population centers once considered insulated from militant activity. ISSP’s incursions into Ayorou and Tillaberi, along with operations in Niamey, demonstrate that no urban area is beyond their reach.
Local self-defense groups, integral to state counterinsurgency efforts, are under unprecedented strain. In Mali, many Dozo militias have been disarmed or forced into agreements with JNIM, leaving communities dependent on militant-enforced security arrangements. In Burkina Faso, the VDP has suffered heavy losses and remains largely on the defensive, limiting the state’s ability to reclaim territory. As these groups weaken, militant groups are likely to expand their territorial control further.
The military partnership between Russia and Sahelian countries has yielded limited results. The transition from the Wagner Group to the Africa Corps left large areas vulnerable, as the latter’s scope is more limited. Toward the end of 2025, the Africa Corps shifted its focus to securing fuel convoys and supply routes in southern Mali, particularly in areas affected by JNIM’s embargo. This partnership is expected to remain critical in 2026, providing essential logistical and aerial support to help juntas maintain control over major transit routes and urban centers, even as broader security challenges persist.
regional instability risks triggering a domino effect
The combination of sustained militant pressure, weakened militias, and declining state capacity heightens the risk of political destabilization in the central Sahel. If either the Malian or Burkinabe military regimes succumb to internal divisions or popular unrest, a regional domino effect could unfold, placing neighboring governments in increasingly precarious positions. If current trends persist, 2026 may witness deeper political instability and territorial fragmentation across the central Sahel and its southern borders.
key data highlights for 2025
- Political violence resulted in the deaths of over 10,000 people in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from January to November.
- Militants kidnapped 30 foreign nationals in Mali (22) and Niger (8).
- ACLED recorded a nearly 70% increase in fatalities in Benin compared to the same period in 2024.
