A strategic break, but no proven price gains
Since the July 2023 coup, Niger has moved decisively away from Orano, the French company that ran its uranium operations for over fifty years. The Somaïr mine was nationalized, the Imouraren permit was withdrawn, and Niamey has since courted Russia while drawing interest from China and Iran. New Western investors have also appeared. The government’s aim is clear: regain control of a strategic resource. Yet one question remains unanswered. Is Niger now selling its uranium on better terms than it did under Orano? The evidence points to a mixed picture. Niamey’s bargaining power has clearly grown, but no public data confirms that it consistently obtains a higher price. More unsettling, several confidential negotiations have been reported, though no hidden contract has been irrefutably established to date.
The split with Orano: sovereignty gained, industry weakened
The break with Orano is not merely diplomatic. It is industrial and financial.
Orano lost operational control of its Nigerien activities in December 2024, before Somaïr, the long-time operator of the Arlit mine, was nationalized on 19 June 2025. The French group, which held 63.4% of Somaïr against 36.6% for the Nigerien state, is contesting the nationalization and has launched several international arbitration proceedings.
The problem for Niamey is that taking back control of a mine does not automatically mean having a market.
Nigerien production has fallen sharply over the past decade: from 4,116 tonnes in 2015 to just 962 tonnes in 2024, according to data reported in 2026. The country now has only one operating mine, while several projects remain undeveloped.
In other words, mining sovereignty has advanced faster than the country’s industrial and commercial capacity.
The uranium price: beware the false case against Orano
A widespread idea compares a supposed “French price” with the current world price. That comparison is misleading.
Uranium does not work like oil: there is no single stock market setting a daily price at which all producers sell. Contracts are negotiated directly between producers, intermediaries and nuclear utilities, with formulas that may include spot indices and long-term prices.
Historical data nonetheless offers an interesting benchmark.
In 2020, available figures indicated that Niger received about 48.1 billion CFA francs for 1,113 tonnes from Cominak and 103.3 billion CFA francs for 1,879 tonnes from Somaïr. For Somaïr, that represented roughly 83.75 euros per kilogram of uranium, based on public data from that time.
Another analysis based on EITI data estimated that uranium bought from Orano had been around 45,000 CFA francs per kilogram in recent years, about 33 dollars per pound, while some European or Japanese buyers reportedly paid around 60,000 CFA francs per kilogram.
The market has since changed considerably.
In 2025, the average spot price paid by European utilities was 70.33 dollars per pound, against 53.59 dollars in 2024. The average price of multi-year contracts, however, was much lower at 54.70 dollars per pound.
By late September 2026, the spot indicator stood at around 89.63 dollars per pound, while the long-term price reached about 96.50 dollars per pound.
The conclusion matters: Niger now operates in a far more favorable price environment than in the early 2020s. But that does not prove Niamey is actually selling its uranium at 90 or 100 dollars per pound.
This is where the file becomes opaque.
The mysterious $170 million Russian contract
The most striking case concerns the yellowcake stockpile accumulated at Arlit.
In 2025, several French sources claimed that Niamey had struck a deal with Russia covering 1,000 tonnes of uranium concentrate for about 170 million dollars. If confirmed, that would equate to roughly 170 dollars per kilogram, or nearly 77 dollars per pound.
That price would be below the late-September 2026 spot price, but comparable to some contractual levels seen on the international market.
The issue is that the agreement was never officially confirmed by both parties. The Nigerien government denied selling the stock, and Rosatom said it was not party to the reported deal.
Yet the case is not simply a rumor without material elements.
In November 2025, about 1,000 tonnes of yellowcake were indeed loaded onto trucks at Arlit. Around thirty vehicles then reached Niamey under military escort. The convoy ultimately found itself stranded at the capital’s airport.
This is precisely where the grey zone begins.
A physical transfer of such scale is not, by itself, proof of a sale. But it shows that Nigerien authorities were actively working to commercialize the stock.
The 170 million dollar figure must therefore be presented as an allegation documented by several sources, not as an established contract.
What about Iran? Confidential talks that left traces
The Russian case is not the first opaque episode.
In 2024, Le Monde revealed confidential negotiations between Niamey and Tehran over 300 tonnes of yellowcake, valued at about 56 million dollars. Several Western and Nigerien sources confirmed the existence of discussions.
The Nigerien government nevertheless denied concluding a sale. An advisor to the authorities did acknowledge that Iran had wanted to buy the 300 tonnes, explaining that Niamey refused for lack of available stock.
Here too, three notions must be distinguished: negotiation, agreement and executed contract.
The available information establishes that negotiations took place. It does not prove that a clandestine delivery occurred.
Russia and China: new allies or new clients?
Russia is now Niamey’s most visible geopolitical partner in the nuclear sector.
In December 2025, the Nigerien company Timersoi National Uranium Company signed a cooperation agreement with Uranium One Group, a subsidiary of the Russian group Rosatom, to explore deposits and eventually develop new mines.
China, too, has shown interest in the Arlit stocks. In 2025, sources reported discussions potentially covering about 1,000 tonnes.
But these new partners do not necessarily guarantee better prices.
Above all, they give Niger more negotiating options.
That is a fundamental difference.
Is Niger actually selling its uranium better today?
At this stage, the most honest answer is: not yet demonstrated.
Niger now has three advantages it did not possess with the same intensity before.
First, the international uranium price is much higher.
Second, Niamey is seeking to diversify its partners: Russia, China, but also Canadian, Australian and American players.
Third, the government now directly controls an essential part of the mining chain.
But three weaknesses limit this strategy: falling production, logistical problems and legal uncertainty linked to the dispute with Orano.
In September 2025, an ICSID arbitral tribunal also ordered Niger not to sell or transfer to third parties the uranium produced by Somaïr that is subject to the litigation.
Political sovereignty alone is therefore not enough to create a solvent market.
The Nigerien paradox
Niger now wants to sell its uranium “at the best price”. But to do so, it must produce regularly, transport its ore safely, attract capital and legally guarantee its contracts.
The country is precisely trying to rebuild that capacity. In 2026, it even created the Teloua Safeguarding Uranium Mining Company, intended to replace the nationalized Somaïr. At the same time, new Western investors are returning: in September 2026, the United States approved up to 414 million dollars in financing for the Dasa project of Global Atomic, backed by a Canadian company.
This may be the real turning point.
Niger is not simply replacing France with Russia. It is gradually trying to turn its uranium into leverage for competition among several powers.
For now, however, no public evidence supports the claim that new contracts bring Niger more than those signed under Orano. International price levels are higher, yes. Negotiating possibilities are more numerous, yes. But the contracts actually signed, their pricing formulas, premiums, logistical costs and the net share returning to the state remain largely opaque.
As for “hidden contracts”, there are confidential negotiations and accusations serious enough to justify investigations, particularly around Iran and Russia. But speaking of definitively established secret contracts would, to date, go beyond the available evidence.
The real issue for Niamey is therefore no longer just whom to sell its uranium to. It is at what price, with what guarantees, and above all what share of that value will actually remain in Niger.