The Sahel has vanished from global headlines. While the world’s attention has been diverted by conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the long-standing crises in the Sahel have grown increasingly dire. More than a decade of instability shows no signs of abating—instead, it is deepening with each passing year.
Military regimes that seized power in recent coups across the region vowed to dismantle jihadist violence. Yet their promises have failed to materialize. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—comprising Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—has seen a surge in extremist attacks, making it the world’s most dangerous zone for jihadist violence. Civilians bear the brunt of this escalation, caught between armed groups and state forces alike.
Compounding the crisis is a stark authoritarian drift in these nations. Democratic transitions have stalled, with election timelines repeatedly postponed. Dissent is met with repression: journalists face censorship or exile, civil society organizations operate under threat, and arbitrary detentions are commonplace. The space for free expression is shrinking, further isolating populations from accurate information about the unfolding conflicts.
This article examines the latest security and political developments in the Sahel, focusing on the AES countries. It explores the rise of jihadist groups, analyzes political trends, and urges the European Union to maintain engagement despite shifting global priorities. Understanding these dynamics is critical not just for the region but for broader regional and international security.
persistent instability: jihadist expansion and local conflicts
A decade ago, the Sahel recorded the lowest number of deaths linked to violent extremism on the African continent. By 2024, it had become the deadliest, with fatalities tripling since 2021 to reach 11,200 deaths. The surge in Islamist terrorism has accelerated since the wave of coups between 2020 and 2023. This toll does not include the 2,430 civilians killed in 2024 by national security forces and their Russian partners. In total, state security actors may have caused more civilian deaths than armed Islamist groups—a disturbing trend that leaves populations in extreme vulnerability.
Mali: trapped between jihadists, separatists, and state forces
The expulsion of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2023 was followed by renewed clashes with Tuareg separatists in northern regions, backed by Russian troops. Since then, Malian security forces have battled both separatist movements and jihadist factions—labeled collectively as “terrorists” by the transitional authorities.
The recapture of Kidal in October 2023—a stronghold held by rebels for over a decade—strengthened the regime’s narrative of sovereignty. Yet, it did little to shift the balance of power. In July 2024, a tactical alliance between the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the Azawad People (CSP-DPA) and the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM, Al-Qaeda affiliate) resulted in a devastating defeat of Malian and Wagner forces at Tinzaouaten, near the Algerian border. The ambush killed about 40 Malian soldiers and 80 Russian mercenaries—the largest loss for Wagner since its deployment in the region.
By late 2024, jihadist groups continued their advance. In September, the JNIM launched simultaneous attacks on a gendarmerie school and the Bamako military airport, killing over 70 security personnel and destroying a presidential aircraft. These high-profile strikes underscored the military’s inability to secure the territory while signaling a strategic boldness. Notably, only military targets were hit, suggesting an attempt to gain or retain public support—a sharp contrast to the Islamic State in the Sahel, which governs through fear.
The civilian toll is severe. In July 2024, an attack on a wedding in the Mopti region killed 40 people. In August, drone strikes by the Malian army in retaliation for the Tinzaouaten ambush killed over 20 civilians. Violence persisted into 2025, with over 50 people killed in February near Gao when jihadists ambushed a military convoy escorting civilians. Despite these threats, 2024 polls showed Malians retain significant confidence in their armed forces, believing in a supposed “rise in power.”
Burkina Faso: state retreat and civilian militarization
Since the 2022 military coup, Burkina Faso’s security situation has deteriorated rapidly. By 2024, reports indicated that the state had lost control of 60% of its territory, with the JNIM active in 11 of the country’s 13 regions. While exact figures are hard to verify, field observers confirm that jihadists move freely across the nation. This growing influence is reflected in rising death tolls: civilian fatalities surged by 68% between 2022 and 2023, with 2024 on track to break that record. The deadliest attack in Burkina Faso’s history occurred in August 2024 in Barsalogho, where jihadists from the JNIM struck as civilians—forced to dig trenches for the army—were massacred. Estimates of the death toll range from 130 to 600 people, a grim milestone for the region.
State forces have also been implicated in atrocities. In February 2024, Human Rights Watch reported that the army executed at least 223 civilians in two villages in a single day. Reports of mutilated bodies and extrajudicial killings continued throughout the year. In March 2024, civilian militias known as Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDPs)—armed and deployed by the regime—allegedly massacred Fulani civilians, a group widely targeted due to suspected ties with jihadist groups. The attack, officially framed as a counterterrorism operation, reportedly killed dozens, mostly women, children, and the elderly. In retaliation, the JNIM launched a major assault on a military camp in Diapaga, killing over 30 soldiers and VDPs and claiming it as the “beginning of the vengeance for Solenzo.”
This spiral of violence stems partly from the regime’s decision to arm civilians. Since 2020, and intensified after the 2022 coup, the Burkinabè government has recruited tens of thousands of VDPs under a controversial program offering two weeks of training, weapons, communication tools, and a monthly stipend of 200,000 CFA francs (about €300), with one-year renewable contracts. Based on selective community enrollment—largely excluding Fulani groups—the initiative has fueled ethnic tensions and intercommunal violence. Villages hosting VDPs have become targets of retaliatory raids, blurring the lines between state forces, militias, jihadists, and civilians. Society is increasingly militarized, with large segments now involuntarily or coercively drawn into armed groups.
Reports in 2024 revealed forced recruitment of political opponents into VDP ranks, stripping the program of its “voluntary” pretenses. Worse still, many VDPs are sent into combat as cannon fodder. This cycle of violence and human rights violations has contributed to Burkina Faso having the highest number of internally displaced persons in the region: over 2 million people have fled their homes.
Niger: rapid deterioration despite relative stability
While Niger has faced fewer jihadist attacks than its AES neighbors, the lethality of violence has risen sharply since the 2023 coup. In the months following, the Nigerien army intensified operations, but civilian deaths at the hands of jihadists and militant casualties at the hands of security forces both surged. Since the coup, state forces have killed three times more civilians than in the previous year, placing civilians between the violence of non-state actors and that of the military.
A 2024 study by the Safeguarding Security Sector Stockpiles (S⁴) initiative found security conditions further degraded: state forces were attacked 51 times in nine months, nearly double the 2023 figure. Concurrently, the number of armed non-state groups increased and became more aggressive. Many 2024 attacks by jihadist groups targeted both civilians and security forces. In March 2024, at least 23 Nigerien soldiers were killed in the Tillabéri region. In December, two successive attacks killed 39 civilians in the west, near the Burkina Faso border. Violence persisted into 2025, with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) attacking a mosque in March, killing 44 people.
Though Niger appears slightly more stable than its neighbors, the situation remains dire: since July 2023, security conditions have continuously worsened.
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Despite shared jihadist threats, key differences persist among AES member states in how they respond. Mali’s government continues to collaborate with Russian troops to fight both jihadists and separatist movements, aiming to reclaim northern territory. Burkina Faso, by contrast, has avoided direct Russian involvement, opting instead to arm and mobilize civilians—a choice that has triggered a vicious cycle of violence and reprisals with the JNIM, devastating civilian populations. Niger has primarily faced threats from the Islamic State in the Sahel, especially along the Mali border and in Tillabéri and Dosso regions. Authorities have also deployed local defense militias, but on a smaller, more controlled scale than Burkina Faso.
A common trend across AES countries is the rise of large-scale, high-casualty attacks, often involving aerial strikes, drones, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and mortar fire—employed by both the JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel. This reflects an evolution in combat tactics. While villages have been targeted, jihadist groups have largely avoided major urban centers like Bamako, focusing instead on rural areas where zakat (alms) collection is easier and state retaliation less likely. However, reports emerging in early April 2025 suggest “community dialogues” between JNIM factions and Malian transitional authorities. If confirmed, these talks could signal a broader strategic shift by the Malian regime, with potential ripple effects across the AES.
prolonged transitions: consolidating power through delay
Since seizing power, the three military regimes of the AES have repeatedly extended their transition timelines and rewritten constitutions to entrench and prolong their rule.
In Mali, the first coup occurred in August 2020. Authorities initially set an 18-month transition with elections slated for February 2022. None were held. After negotiations with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a 24-month transition was announced in June 2021, with polls set for February 2024. By late 2023, officials cited “technical” delays—including a new constitution and a census conducted by a French firm—to justify postponement. In May 2024, three months after the theoretical transition end, an inter-Malian dialogue recommended a new transition period of two to five years, allowing the junta leader to remain in power until 2029 and potentially run in elections. In October 2024, Colonel Goïta promoted himself to army general—the country’s highest military rank—and appointed five regime members to the same rank, signaling a clear consolidation of power. While election discussions briefly resurfaced in late 2024, they had disappeared by early 2025.
In Burkina Faso, Captain Traoré—leader of the September 2022 coup—initially promised elections by July 2024. By late 2023, he declared elections “not a priority” and announced a constitutional reform. In May 2024, the transition duration was set at 60 months, allowing Traoré to remain in office until 2029. This move mirrored Mali’s strategy, reinforcing his grip on power.
Among the AES states, Niger’s regime has been the most resistant to setting an election date. For over 18 months, it avoided announcing a timeline. Only after a brief “national dialogue” in February 2025 did it recommend a renewable five-year transition. Like his counterparts, junta leader Tchiani promoted himself to army general in March 2025 as he was sworn in for a five-year presidential term.
The prolonged, near-permanent nature of these transitions allows leaders to lay the groundwork for a Sahel confederation. New, democratically elected leaders might have been less inclined to pursue the AES project or sever ties with ECOWAS due to economic and political costs. But with five years of guaranteed power and the possibility of re-election, current regimes have the leeway to forge new regional and international partnerships—such as Russia’s recent pledge of support for the AES joint force. The European Union must integrate this new reality into its re-engagement strategies.
authoritarian drift: controlling territory through information
Unable to assert full control over their territories, AES regimes have tightened their grip on information. Since the coups, independent and foreign media outlets have been suspended or banned, foreign journalists expelled, and local reporters repressed through arbitrary arrests. Political parties and civil society organizations have been suspended or placed under heavy surveillance.
In Mali, the Goïta administration has progressively restricted free expression since 2020. By 2022, authorities banned Radio France Internationale (RFI) and France 24, then temporarily suspended Joliba TV News. In November 2024, Burkina Faso’s High Authority for Communication notified Malian authorities about a TV program depicting a staged coup. The result? The private channel’s broadcast license was revoked, illustrating growing coordination among AES regimes to control media narratives.
Between 2022 and 2024, criticism of transitional governments led to arbitrary arrests and harassment. A notable example: the expulsion of the UN human rights chief in February 2023, just before MINUSMA’s withdrawal. By late 2023 and early 2024, several NGOs were shut down. In 2024, political parties faced three-month suspensions, and media were barred from reporting on them, further tightening authoritarian control.
In Burkina Faso, Captain Traoré followed a similar path: two foreign journalists were expelled without justification. RFI and France 24 were banned, and Jeune Afrique was suspended for allegedly discrediting the military. In 2024, TV5Monde was suspended for airing a critical interview with a former election commission president. Since early 2025, a new wave of repression has targeted media and exiled opponents, placed on “terrorist lists” to intimidate them. In March, three journalists were abducted and reappeared ten days later in military uniforms, forced to claim they were “covering the reality on the ground”—a textbook case of forced conscription.
Niger is no exception. Within a week of the 2023 coup, RFI and France 24 were suspended. Since then, other media outlets have been shut down, and journalists covering security issues have faced intimidation and imprisonment. Human rights organizations have documented arbitrary detentions, including former President Mohamed Bazoum and seven cabinet members, enforced disappearances, violations of fair trial rights, and attacks on press freedom. Political parties have been suspended since July 2023, silencing formal opposition.
Since October 2024, Nigerien authorities have confiscated the passports of foreigners arriving at Niamey International Airport, sometimes holding them until departure—complicating research and travel. This tactic gives regimes leverage over external actors.
By controlling information and civil society, AES regimes reinforce their power. In October 2024, Burkina Faso’s government claimed it controlled 70% of its territory—a figure matching the percentage attributed to jihadist groups by external research. For citizens, discerning the true state of the nation has become increasingly difficult.
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The Sahel has received scant media coverage over the past year. This stems from competing global crises and the growing repression of independent media in AES countries, coupled with waning Western public interest following forced withdrawals from the region.
Yet, as this article shows, the silence surrounding the Sahel does not equate to stability or security—it masks deepening chaos.
All the crises that once motivated European and Western engagement in the region persist and are worsening. Jihadist expansion is accelerating, food insecurity is worsening: between June and August 2025, 52.7 million people in West Africa are at risk of acute hunger. The number of internally displaced persons has reached record highs, with over 3.1 million displaced across Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Chad by March 2025.
The Sahel may no longer be a strategic priority for the European Union amid other crises. But it would be a mistake to believe the region’s turmoil will not reverberate across Europe in the medium or long term. Disengaging from the Sahel is not just about severing ties with military regimes—it is about abandoning the people.
As the EU reassesses its approach—marked by France’s reduced visibility—cautious steps toward re-engagement have begun, including through the new EU Special Representative. But before advancing further, Europe must clarify its priorities in a region increasingly open to new partners. What does it want to achieve? What can it realistically accomplish? And with whom?
What is clear is that in a world increasingly polarized, strengthening bonds, knowledge exchange, and solidarity between continents, regions, and societies is urgent to confront global challenges together.
