The Russian judiciary’s decision on 5 October 2026 to formally designate thirteen individuals and five organisations from the Baltic states as accomplices of Nazi Germany has set off a wave of reactions across Europe and raised a difficult question: what comes next? The ruling, issued by a district court in Moscow, converts a chapter of the Second World War into a fresh instrument of political confrontation. Beyond the memory of wartime crimes, Moscow now explicitly invokes the defence of its “national interests” — a rhetoric that stretches far beyond the confines of history and lands squarely in a moment when tensions between Russia, the Baltic states and NATO have reached unprecedented levels.
Thirteen names, five organisations, and a trial held without defendants
The case could have stayed confined to Second World War archives. Instead, it has taken on a geopolitical dimension.
In late September, the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office petitioned the Tver district court in Moscow to have the responsibility of thirteen individuals and five Baltic organisations legally recognised for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Nazi occupation.
On 5 October, the court granted the request. Among the organisations targeted are the Estonian Omakaitse, the Latvian formations Aizsargi and Pērkonkrusts, as well as the Lithuanian Activist Front and the Union of Lithuanian Nationalists. Individuals named include Ain-Ervin Mere, Viktor Arājs and Herberts Cukurs.
Moscow says it relied on archival documents from security services, the Ministry of Defence and Russian state archives. The Russian Council on Military History also took part in preparing the expert assessment submitted to the court.
On one point, the historical reminder is not without foundation: the collaboration of certain Baltic formations and individuals with the German occupation authorities, and their involvement in crimes against civilians and Soviet prisoners, is a subject extensively documented by historians.
But Moscow’s move is clearly not limited to a commemorative gesture.
When memory becomes a political tool
In its 5 October statement, the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office presented the decision as a “fact of legal significance.” It said the ruling should help preserve historical memory and combat what it calls the falsification of history. Crucially, the institution explicitly tied the move to the protection of the Russian Federation’s national interests.
That last formulation is what gives the case its particular weight.
For several years, Moscow has accused Baltic authorities of rewriting the history of the Second World War and glorifying collaborators of the Nazi regime. In September, the Prosecutor General’s Office was already denouncing what it described as a systematic policy.
The vocabulary used fits into a broader Kremlin rhetoric: one that presents Russia as the heir to the Soviet victory over Nazism and as facing a supposed resurgence of “fascism” or “Nazism” among some of its neighbours.
This framing had already occupied a central place in Russian discourse on Ukraine. Its extension to the three Baltic states is therefore politically significant.
The Baltic states in Moscow’s sights
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are not simply Russia’s neighbours. They are members of the European Union and NATO, and now form one of the main points of contact between the Atlantic Alliance and Russian territory.
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the three countries have adopted some of Europe’s firmest positions toward Moscow. They strongly support Kyiv and regard Russia as a direct threat to their security.
Baltic governments regularly reject Russian accusations of propaganda and discrimination. In April 2026, Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius had already jointly denounced what they called a Russian disinformation campaign targeting their countries.
The new legal procedure thus risks reinforcing an already established dynamic: in Moscow, history is used to challenge the political legitimacy of its neighbours; in Baltic capitals, Russian pressure is used to justify further military cooperation with the West.
A legal dimension… but what consequences?
Extrapolation should be avoided, however: the Tver court’s decision does not, on its own, mean that military or territorial action against the Baltic states is imminent.
The procedure concerns historical figures and organisations, most of them dead or disbanded, and relates to events dating back to the Second World War.
Its importance lies elsewhere.
By labelling these facts as “legally significant,” Moscow is adding a new piece to its historical and diplomatic argument. Some Russian officials have already pointed out that the decision could be used in international forums.
The risk is therefore one of a gradual instrumentalisation of law and history: producing national judicial decisions, integrating them into a diplomatic narrative, then using them to challenge the political or historical legitimacy of the Baltic states.
This is what some observers describe as a form of lawfare — the use of law as an instrument of political confrontation.
NATO faces a war of narratives
The stakes thus go beyond Moscow, Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn. They directly concern NATO.
The Baltic states are covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. The gradual transformation of Russian historical discourse into a political argument therefore creates a particularly sensitive strategic environment.
This tension comes at a time when military concerns in the region are already high. Russia has recently multiplied warnings about NATO activity around Kaliningrad, while the Alliance insists its posture in the region is defensive.
On 6 October, Moscow also reacted sharply to Lithuanian plans regarding the evolution of its nuclear policy and to the possibility of an increased US military presence in the country. The Kremlin denounced a possible escalation linked to the approach of US and NATO military infrastructure toward Russian borders.
Against this backdrop, the battle over memory is far from inconsequential.
A new frontline
The “Baltic collaborators” case ultimately illustrates a broader evolution in the confrontation between Russia and the West: the battlefields are no longer only military.
Archives, courts, historical memory, diplomacy and public communication are also becoming instruments of power.
It would be excessive to see in the Moscow court’s ruling proof of an immediate plan of aggression against the Baltic states. But it would be just as unwise to dismiss it as a mere historians’ quarrel.
By simultaneously invoking the memory of the Second World War, the fight against “Nazism” and the protection of Russian national interests, Moscow is building a narrative that directly links past to present.
And in a region where three NATO member states lie just tens or hundreds of kilometres from Russian territory, this battle of narratives could have very real consequences for European security.