The interpretation of a coup d’état often shifts, influenced by the international community’s various interests and the endorsements of neighboring states. In Burkina Faso, the selection of Transitional President Michel Kafando was deemed unconstitutional. For at least twelve months, Burkina Faso will operate under newly established, provisional institutions.
Like pieces in a meticulously assembled construction, Burkina Faso‘s transitional institutions are gradually taking shape. Since the military’s emergence on the public stage following the swift departure of the “Sphinx of Kosyam,” a sense of calm appears to be returning to Ouagadougou. Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, seemingly from nowhere, quickly asserted his authority, assuming all the responsibilities of a Head of State.
What were his true motivations? How did he manage to integrate himself among the protestors and political party leaders so effectively? Was his deployment to the Place de la Révolution, perhaps, a concerted strategy between President Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré to maintain some control over power? Initially, an officer from the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) aligning with the populace naturally sparked considerable distrust and suspicion. The immediate actions and policies implemented by the military in the initial days raised concerns about a potential junta, including the suspension of the Constitution and the dissolution of the National Assembly. This threatened to strip the people, who had sacrificed and shed blood, of their hard-won victory.
The African Union, consistent with its past responses, promptly threatened to impose sanctions on Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, ECOWAS heads of state—including John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, and Macky Sall of Senegal—arrived in force to engage with the military leadership, urging them to reconsider their stance. The precedents set by Captains Daddis Camara in Guinea and Sanogo in Mali undoubtedly prompted Burkinabé officers to deliberate carefully. They understood that seizing power by force would no longer go unpunished, and a protracted crisis resolution process risked isolating the nation, leading to growing public disapproval.
Consequently, the military ultimately negotiated a compromise solution, formalized within the Transition Charter. The agreement stipulated that a civilian would lead the Executive as President of the Transition, while the military would retain significant influence over the government. Concurrently, a 90-member legislative body, the National Transitional Council (CNT), was established to accommodate those who spearheaded the popular struggle. A Designation Committee, comprising about twenty members, was tasked with the crucial responsibility of appointing a Transitional President. This interim mandate was set to conclude in November 2015, aligning with the original end of President Blaise Compaoré’s term.
For the selection of the Head of State, each vital national component—the military, civil society, opposition parties, and religious and traditional authorities—was required to submit a shortlist within a specified timeframe. Ultimately, five individuals were chosen for consideration.
The opposition and civil society put forward two journalists: Newton Ahmed Barry, who edits the weekly “L’Evènement,” and Chériff Sy Moumina, publishing director of the weekly “Bendré.” Their legitimacy stemmed from their media outlets’ strong criticism of the former regime. The military, conversely, adopted a broader approach, diversifying candidate profiles to include an ecclesiastic, Archbishop Mgr Ouédraogo of Bobo Dioulasso; a diplomat, Michel Kafando; and a woman who was also a former minister, Joséphine Ouédraogo. Early on, Archbishop Ouédraogo, initially a strong contender, declared his disinterest in the position, preferring to continue his current ministry.
The remaining two candidates held a distinct advantage over the others due to their extensive experience in major international institutions. Ms. Joséphine Ouédraogo had previously worked with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), while Michel Kafando had twice represented his nation at the UN headquarters in New York, serving between 1981 and 1982, and again from 1998 to 2011. In the land of “the Upright Man,” an invisible divide often separates the population into those for or against Thomas Sankara. This implicit ideological split has historically influenced every political figure’s trajectory. Joséphine Ouédraogo served as Minister of Family Development and Solidarity from 1984 to 1987. Michel Kafando, on the other hand, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in Prime Minister Thomas Sankara’s government under President Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo in 1982. The two men reportedly had disagreements regarding the conduct of Upper Volta’s diplomacy and were ideologically diametrically opposed.
A career in international organizations provided a dual benefit: enhancing one’s curriculum vitae and expanding one’s professional network. This was a notable disadvantage for the two aspiring journalists put forward by the opposition.
For the upcoming months, Michel Kafando, a retired diplomat, will set aside his cattle and poultry farming in Saponé for a crucial mission: safeguarding the nation in peril. He will concurrently hold the Presidency of the Transition and the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dual role streamlines diplomatic engagement, offering a single point of contact for international partners and circumventing Prime Minister Isaac Zida.
The unfolding situation in Burkina Faso was closely observed from various capitals, including Accra, which currently chairs ECOWAS; Addis Ababa, home to the African Union; and Paris and Washington, due to geopolitical considerations. On the day of Michel Kafando’s inauguration, several Heads of State from Mauritania (African Union), Ghana (ECOWAS), Togo, Benin, Mali, and Niger traveled to Ouagadougou, signaling a move to rehabilitate Burkina Faso. Did this significant international presence implicitly endorse the reinstatement of a constitution that had been suspended just weeks prior? The United States typically adheres to a principle of not cooperating with heads of state who have not received a popular mandate, which is currently the case in Burkina Faso. However, the international community seemingly found a way to legitimize the coup and re-establish a semblance of constitutional order. This ensures that American reconnaissance aircraft can remain stationed in Ouagadougou, as the US relies on Mauritania and Burkina Faso as vital strategic footholds for monitoring the Sahel region.
Out of 26 ministerial positions, the military secured four critical portfolios: the Prime Minister also assumed the Ministry of Defense; Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, a former Security Minister in 2011, was appointed to Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS); Colonel David Kabré, spokesperson for Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, took charge of Sports; and Boubacar Ba began his tenure at the highly strategic Ministry of Mines and Energy. Joséphine Ouédraogo was assigned the position of Keeper of the Seals, a form of consolation prize, while Augustin Loada, a university professor and prominent civil society figure, was named to the Public Service. Adama Sagnon, who inherited the Ministry of Culture, resigned merely days after his appointment due to pressure from civil society, which criticized the former prosecutor for allegedly “shelving” the Norbert Zongo case.
The National Transitional Council (CNT), the interim legislative body, elected Chériff Sy Moumina, one of the unsuccessful presidential candidates for the Transition, as its president. He secured 71 out of 90 votes from his peers. The next critical step involves completing the institutional framework and mechanisms necessary to guide Burkina Faso towards transparent and equitable elections, including establishing the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), drafting the electoral code, and enacting organic laws.
What crucial objectives will this brief transitional period address?
Since early December, Michel Kafando has signed a presidential decree establishing the Commission for National Reconciliation and Reforms (CRNR). What is the scope of this body, and what is the duration of its mandate? Over 27 years after Thomas Sankara’s assassination, the “Land of the Upright Man” finally seeks to embark on a process of national catharsis. Immediately following his appointment, one of President Michel Kafando’s first decisions was to authorize investigations to identify Thomas Sankara’s remains. Prime Minister Isaac Zida was equally proactive, announcing that the file concerning President Thomas Sankara’s assassination would be “fully opened” and that, if necessary, Burkina Faso would request Morocco’s “extradition” of former President Blaise Compaoré.
Through a series of high-profile announcements, the current leadership has effectively opened a Pandora’s Box. Such complex cases typically demand an extended period that will likely exceed the transitional phase. Were these declarations made to reassure opponents of the Blaise Compaoré regime? As Minister of Defense, military reform should have been his priority. In this context, General Gilbert Diendéré—Blaise Compaoré’s chief of staff and thus Isaac Zida’s direct superior—was relieved of his duties by President Michel Kafando. He was replaced by Commander Théophile Nikièma, a former head of the RSP’s “Operations and Instruction” Bureau and also the director of External Documentation, which functions as the intelligence service of the Kosyam palace.
Will Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida and Commander Théophile Nikièma maintain their loyalty to General Gilbert Diendéré? Burkina Faso successfully defused the political crisis of October 30, which led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, with relatively few complications. The intervention of RSP elements during the initial skirmishes could have easily triggered a civil war. Would it not be more prudent to concentrate on organizing elections rather than implicating General Gilbert Diendéré and other living civilian and military figures by resurrecting the Sankara file?
How can a “witch hunt” be avoided? Already, two general managers of major national companies, considered close to the family of the ousted president, have been dismissed: Jean-Baptiste Bérehoundougou from Société Nationale Burkinabè des Hydrocarbures (SONABHY) and Jean Christophe Ilboudo from Société Nationale Burkinabè d’Electricité (SONABEL). While an act of contrition may not fully absolve past wrongdoings, it can contribute to reconciliation; this was the recent approach taken by Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), a political party affiliated with the former presidential movement. Similarly, the nation paid homage to the seven individuals who fell victim to gunfire during the events of October 30 and 31. They now rest in the Gounghin cemetery.
Will the CRNR continue its work beyond the end of the transitional period? Now that all institutions are in place, political figures and parties will take center stage. No prominent political leader sought a seat within either the Executive or the CNT, which effectively disqualifies them from running in universal suffrage elections. Presidential candidates are already poised for the upcoming electoral race. The formation of the CNT also served as an occasion for the CFOP, the opposition coalition, to dissolve itself. The electoral battle is certainly expected to commence at the very beginning of 2015.
