For years, Mali’s geopolitical story seemed set in stone. After severing ties with France and European forces, Bamako under General Assimi Goïta turned decisively toward Moscow, welcoming Wagner operatives and later Africa Corps units while steadily dismantling its partnerships with Western nations.
By 2026, that narrative is showing cracks. Mali has not formally broken with Russia, yet signs of a cautious re-engagement with the United States are multiplying: intelligence-sharing arrangements, talks about American surveillance flights, and the lifting of sanctions on senior Malian officials. The strategic question hanging over the Sahel is whether Bamako can genuinely balance two rival powers — or whether it is quietly preparing to pivot back toward Washington.
A quiet american re-entry into Mali’s security landscape
The most striking signal of this shift concerns military intelligence.
In March 2026, reports emerged that Washington and Bamako were nearing an agreement that would allow the United States to resume aircraft and drone flights over Mali to monitor jihadist groups, particularly JNIM, the Al-Qaeda affiliate. The talks followed a February decision by Washington to lift sanctions against Mali’s defense minister and several senior officials.
This development is far from trivial.
During the period of tension with Western powers, Bamako had positioned Russia as the partner capable of replacing the old Western powers. Today, Malian authorities are once again willing to discuss with Washington capabilities they clearly need: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The United States had already shared intelligence with Malian authorities, some of which reportedly contributed to an operation against JNIM figures. Washington now seeks to institutionalize this cooperation further.
The paradox is striking: a Mali that turned its back on the West to embrace Moscow may be rediscovering Washington’s strategic value.
Russia’s security record: a growing embarrassment for Bamako
Why is this shift happening now? Part of the answer lies in the security record of recent years.
To be precise: Wagner’s arrival in Mali does not mean the entire security deterioration is attributable to Russia. The country was already facing a jihadist insurgency before French forces left. Armed groups have deep local roots and benefit from political, social, economic, and geographic factors that far exceed the presence of any foreign power.
Yet the statistics reveal a reality that is hard to dismiss: replacing Western partners with Russian forces has not durably curbed the violence.
The U.S. State Department’s 2022 report indicated that terrorist activities had increased in number and lethality. That year, France completed its withdrawal from Mali, with the last French soldier leaving on August 15, 2022. Meanwhile, Malian forces occupied former French positions with Wagner’s support. The State Department described 2022 as the deadliest year in Mali’s history in terms of terrorist violence and counterterrorism operations.
The following year did not reverse the trend.
According to the 2023 U.S. terrorism report, terrorist activities increased further in number and intensity. The document describes 2023 as the deadliest year in Mali’s history, taking into account both terrorist attacks and operations by Malian forces conducted with Wagner.
The finding is particularly awkward for the narrative that presented the Russian partnership as the solution to Mali’s security problem.
From Wagner to africa corps: Moscow has not disappeared
It would be premature, however, to announce Russia’s departure.
Wagner has been gradually replaced by Africa Corps, directly linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense. Moscow therefore retains a significant military and political presence in Mali.
But that presence is also experiencing setbacks.
In April 2026, an offensive by JNIM and Tuareg fighters inflicted serious reverses on Malian forces and their Russian allies. Mali’s defense minister, Sadio Camara, who was trained in Russia, was killed in an attack. Africa Corps also had to withdraw from Kidal, a strategic northern city it had helped retake in 2023.
Reports at the time indicated that these setbacks had severely damaged Russia’s image as a guarantor of security in Mali. ACLED analyst Héni Nsaibia even argued that JNIM’s successive campaigns, the fuel blockade, and recent events illustrated the failure of the Russian intervention.
This is, of course, an analysis, not a universal verdict. But it highlights a problem that has become difficult to ignore: Moscow has not succeeded in ending the insurgency.
Security still under pressure
Data available in 2025 reinforces this question.
According to ACLED figures cited by news agencies, Malian forces and Russian paramilitary groups Wagner and Africa Corps reportedly killed 918 civilians in Mali in 2025, compared with 232 attributed to JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel. These figures concern documented deaths and must therefore be interpreted with caution. They nevertheless reflect the scale of violence and the accusations against government forces and their Russian allies.
At the same time, jihadists have continued to advance. JNIM has notably managed to disrupt the country’s supply routes and impose considerable pressure on Bamako.
In March 2026, Malian authorities even released around 200 people detained for alleged links to jihadists as part of an arrangement aimed at securing a truce on attacks against fuel convoys, according to Le Monde.
For a junta that came to power promising to restore sovereignty and security, the symbolism is heavy.
Mali may no longer be choosing between Moscow and Washington
It would be too early, however, to speak of a rupture with Russia.
Moscow retains considerable interests in Mali, particularly in the gold, lithium, and energy sectors. Russia has supported mining and energy projects and continues to assert its commitment alongside Bamako.
Mali’s strategy therefore appears to be evolving toward a pragmatic logic: no longer depending on a single partner.
After making Moscow the main security recourse following the French departure, Bamako now seems to recognize that Russia alone cannot meet all its military and intelligence needs.
This is where the United States re-enters the picture.
Washington offers what Moscow does not necessarily provide under the same conditions: aerial and satellite intelligence capability, considerable technological resources, and in-depth knowledge of jihadist networks.
The rapprochement with America may therefore be less an ideological conversion than a pragmatic observation: Mali needs multiple partners to confront a threat that its alliance with Russia has not succeeded in eliminating.
From western rupture to pragmatism
Mali’s recent history is thus undergoing a new reversal.
Yesterday, Bamako denounced the French and European presence and presented Russia as the sovereign alternative. Today, discussions with Washington are resuming at a level that would have seemed improbable just a few years ago.
Russia remains in Mali. But its security record is contested, its forces have suffered setbacks, and jihadists continue to threaten the country.
In this context, the American-Malian rapprochement appears to be much more than a simple diplomatic episode. It could mark the beginning of a new foreign policy for Bamako: no longer replacing one partner with another, but using rivalry between great powers to obtain from each what Mali needs.
Mali has therefore not yet abandoned Russia. But one thing is now clear: Russia’s monopoly on Mali’s security partnership may already be a thing of the past.
