The withdrawal of Chad from the International Criminal Court: a broader crisis of confidence
Chad’s decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on 27 July 2026 marks a significant shift in the political and institutional landscape of the Sahel. This move follows the earlier announcements by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in 2025, all citing concerns over the Court’s perceived inefficacy and what their governments describe as a selective application of international justice.
Far from being a mere legal dispute, this series of withdrawals reflects a deepening crisis of trust between several African governments and international judicial institutions. Yet, it raises a critical question: what happens when states that criticise the shortcomings of international justice choose to disengage without first establishing robust national and regional judicial mechanisms to replace it?
A criticism that extends beyond the ICC
The governments involved justify their withdrawal on the grounds of sovereignty. They argue that the ICC’s track record, operational methods, and what they perceive as a bias in addressing international crises warrant their departure.
This critique cannot be dismissed outright. Since its inception, the ICC has faced recurring criticism regarding the concentration of its proceedings on the African continent, particularly as major global powers remain outside the Rome Statute. The debates surrounding the Court’s functioning, resources, independence, and balance of action are therefore entirely valid.
However, acknowledging an institution’s flaws does not necessarily mean abandoning it altogether.
The more pressing question should be how to enhance international justice to make it more credible, universal, and equitable. Withdrawing from the ICC does not erase the crimes within its jurisdiction. Crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international law persist, regardless of a state’s legal status.
The looming threat of a judicial void
This is where one of the primary concerns lies. In the Sahelian nations affected, armed conflicts have led to grave allegations of abuses by both armed groups and state forces, as well as their auxiliaries. Human rights organisations have documented years of violence against civilians and highlight the challenges in accessing justice and reparations. The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, for instance, could deprive victims of additional avenues to seek truth, justice, and redress, according to documented assessments.
In this context, weakening an international mechanism without simultaneously ensuring the independence, effectiveness, and accessibility of national courts could create a particularly alarming situation.
A strong national judiciary can indeed address the gravest crimes, and it may even be preferable when it allows victims to access justice more swiftly and in a manner better suited to local realities. However, this requires genuine independence from political influence, adequate resources, and the ability to investigate all parties involved in a conflict.
Without these safeguards, sovereignty over justice risks becoming a shield against accountability.
Withdrawal does not erase legal obligations
It is also essential to avoid oversimplification: exiting the Rome Statute does not immediately absolve a state of all obligations.
The Statute outlines a precise procedure. For Chad, the notification of withdrawal was submitted on 27 July 2026, with the process only taking effect a year later. Until then, the country remains bound by its responsibilities as a State Party. Furthermore, withdrawal does not retroactively nullify procedures within the Court’s jurisdiction for crimes committed prior to its entry into force.
This nuance is crucial, as it demonstrates that leaving the ICC is not an immediate erasure of international responsibility.
However, it raises a pressing question for the future: once the withdrawal takes full effect, what mechanisms will ensure that alleged perpetrators of international crimes do not simply exploit the weakening of oversight?
The promise of African justice must now be fulfilled
The governments criticising the ICC often advocate for a more independent African justice system, better aligned with the continent’s realities.
On principle, this ambition warrants support.
Africa should not be forced into a false dichotomy between a perceived distant international justice and national judicial systems sometimes weakened by political crises. The continent can—and must—develop its own mechanisms of justice, including through continental institutions and national courts.
Yet, this alternative cannot remain a mere political slogan.
A genuine African justice system must be capable of investigating crimes committed by all parties, including state actors. It should ensure the independence of judges, the protection of witnesses, victim access to proceedings, and the pursuit of accountability without regard for political or military rank.
The trial of Hissène Habré serves as a reminder that African judicial mechanisms can advance the fight against impunity. The challenge now is to transform this experience into a sustainable institutional capacity.
The danger of politically motivated justice
The issue becomes even more sensitive when the withdrawal from an international judicial institution occurs in a context of power consolidation and shrinking political space.
A credible justice system cannot depend on the whims of the ruling government.
If a state chooses to leave the ICC on the grounds of perceived injustice, it must meet an additional requirement: demonstrating that it can uphold an even more independent and rigorous justice system domestically.
Otherwise, sovereignty risks becoming a one-sided argument: sovereignty to reject external oversight, but not necessarily judicial sovereignty to enable citizens to hold violators accountable.
This is where the true danger lies.
The first victims: civilians in conflict zones
In conflict-affected areas, institutional debates in The Hague may feel distant. For a family that has lost a loved one, a victim of forced displacement, or someone who has suffered grave rights violations, the question is far more immediate: who will investigate, who will listen to witnesses, and who will deliver justice?
While international justice is not flawless often slow, costly, and constrained by political limitations it remains an additional safeguard when national institutions are unable or unwilling to act.
The gradual disappearance of this safety net could have severe consequences for victims.
This does not mean the ICC should be shielded from criticism. On the contrary, African critiques should be heeded and used to demand profound reforms in international justice. However, the response to a sense of injustice should not be the outright abandonment of accountability mechanisms.
A decision that further weakens the international system
The successive withdrawals of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and now Chad occur at a time when the ICC itself faces significant institutional challenges. Chad’s departure follows mounting international pressures on the Court and difficulties in renewing its leadership.
Each withdrawal potentially reduces the Court’s political and geographical reach.
In the long term, the risk is that more states will come to view international institutions as acceptable only when they serve their interests. Such an evolution would undermine the very principle of a rules-based international justice.
International criminal justice can only be credible if it applies universally. Yet, this universality also requires states to submit to independent mechanisms, even when they become politically inconvenient.
The true challenge: building a credible alternative
The withdrawal from the ICC should not be seen as an end in itself.
If Sahelian governments genuinely wish to demonstrate their capacity to build a more sovereign justice system, they must now provide concrete answers: strengthening national courts, guaranteeing judicial independence, protecting witnesses, documenting crimes, ensuring victim reparations, and establishing regional mechanisms capable of prosecuting the gravest crimes.
Only under these conditions can the discourse on judicial sovereignty become credible.
Otherwise, the risk is transitioning from an imperfect international system to an even more precarious situation, where victims have fewer recourse and perpetrators enjoy greater impunity.
The debate on the ICC should not artificially pit “African sovereignty” against “international justice.” The real issue lies elsewhere: how can we ensure that, across Africa, no political authority, military leader, armed group, or influential figure remains above the law?
This is the question that Sahelian governments must address. While leaving the ICC may be presented as an act of sovereignty, building an independent justice system capable of holding the powerful and the weak alike accountable would be a far more compelling demonstration of that sovereignty.
