It is now clear and well documented that the story of the so-called hidden debt, first brought up during a press conference by Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko on September 26, 2024, was a massive falsehood. Knowledgeable observers had warned, yet a whole propaganda machine kept these false allegations alive in public debate.
Today, the main protagonist himself admits he said everything but the truth. Given the severe consequences this declaration had on Senegal’s credibility, its relations with partners, and the hardships faced by Senegalese, can the prosecutor be asked to pursue Sonko for high economic treason, dissemination of false economic news, and lying? And also to pursue all those who helped sustain this lie?
To assess this question, one must first distinguish political controversy from its potential legal implications. It is not just the content of the statement that matters, but also the status of its author, the context in which it was made, and the effects it may have had on trust in the state.
“When I spoke on certain occasions, I was speaking as a party leader giving his opinion.” This statement by Sonko on international media raises a major legal and institutional difficulty. The accusations that affected the perception of Senegal’s economy cannot be seen as mere partisan positions when they came from an authority holding government functions. As Prime Minister, with control over the administration according to Article 57 of the Constitution, the author of such remarks necessarily committed the authority of the state and could influence the confidence of Senegal’s external partners.
The sequence surrounding the so-called “hidden debt” illustrates this ambiguity. By claiming he was speaking as party leader and did not yet have “all the levers of the state,” Sonko tries to place his declarations back in the realm of political opposition. However, this justification must be confronted with the institutional framework in which the issue was then brought before public opinion. Indeed, it was not just a partisan speech. It was a government press conference that had on the podium, besides Prime Minister Sonko, the Minister-Secretary General of the Government, the Minister of Economy, and the Minister of Justice. That day, the debt issue was presented with particular gravity and repeated in institutional settings, notably during a press conference at the Prime Minister’s office and before parliament. In these circumstances, the speech could no longer be equated with that of a simple political leader: it was the public word of a Prime Minister and, as such, committed the authority of the state.
Doctor after death
Argumentative coherence requires distinguishing between two levels. On one hand, political criticism remains legitimate when based on verifiable elements. On the other hand, when an accusation is presented in an institutional framework and produces effects on public or financial confidence, it must be supported by sufficiently established evidence. Otherwise, it exposes its authors to criticism of responsibility, not only political but also institutional. Hence the question of whether the prosecutor can intervene for dissemination of false economic news. This distinction leads naturally to examining the role of the Court of Auditors. If the controversy was fueled by political interpretations, it is appropriate to return to the findings made by the institution responsible for controlling public accounts to measure the gap between the report itself and the qualifications drawn from it.
In this context, the interview given by Mamadou Faye, predecessor of Abdoul Magib Guèye at the head of the Court of Auditors, reignites the polemic. By asserting that nowhere in the Court’s report is the word “hidden debt” mentioned, the former magistrate acted like a doctor after death. Asked about the existence of a “hidden debt,” the magistrate refers to the report itself and emphasizes that no page explicitly mentions this qualification. This precision is decisive: it distinguishes the Court’s technical findings from the political interpretations that may have been drawn from them. Indeed, for two years, he watched Sonko, in complicity with Bassirou Diomaye Faye, drag Senegal into a sterile debate without ever reacting. Mamadou Faye would have done better to remain silent forever. But returning to the publication of the February 2025 report, he recalls that the institution limited itself to presenting its findings according to its own control methods. He also details the working method followed by the Court. The debt-to-GDP ratio was calculated according to the TOFE method (Table of State Financial Operations), as well as according to the budget method based on the difference between revenue and expenditure relative to GDP. According to this explanation, the two approaches should have led to consistent results if the transition table had been correctly used.
Thus, the absence of explicit mention of the concept of “hidden debt” does not by itself close the debate, but it weakens the political qualification that was made. It shifts the center of gravity of the discussion: it is no longer just a question of whether accounting anomalies existed, but of determining whether their public presentation was accurate, proportionate, and legally responsible.
The controversy around this lie is therefore not neutral. By prolonging without sufficiently firm clarification, it contributed to weakening Senegal’s financial credibility, fueling uncertainty among economic actors, and weighing on the perception of rating agencies. The responsibility of public actors must then be assessed in light of the foreseeable effects of their statements, especially when they concern debt, the sincerity of public accounts, and the state’s ability to honor its commitments.
Financial credibility of the state
This analysis echoes the warnings already made in this column. We emphasized that imprudent government communication on debt could weaken market confidence, provoke a negative reaction from investors, lead to a downgrade of the sovereign rating, and increase the cost of borrowing. If these effects materialize, they can then reduce budgetary margins, slow investment, and weigh on employment.
After the publication of the Court of Auditors’ report, the challenge was not to turn administrative dysfunctions into a political scandal, but to precisely determine their nature, extent, and legal consequences. The report first called for an administrative, budgetary, and institutional response: correction of procedures, improvement of accounting traceability, and clarification of possible responsibilities.
This requirement for rigor does not only concern public debt. It applies more broadly to any spectacular economic statement likely to engage the state’s credibility or create expectations in public opinion without sufficient evidentiary basis.
The same requirement applies to claims about the alleged existence of 1000 billion CFA francs in an account attributed to a former dignitary of the outgoing regime. A declaration of this nature, when it comes from a public official, cannot rest on simple affirmation. It must be supported by verifiable elements that can be examined by competent jurisdictions or authorized control bodies. Otherwise, it fuels confusion, weakens institutional trust, and exposes its author to a challenge on the grounds of responsibility. Asking the prosecutor to self-refer is not just a partisan controversy. It refers to a broader principle: public speech, especially when it comes from a government authority, must be proportionate, verifiable, and compatible with the requirements of institutional stability. When economic statements are likely to affect the state’s financial credibility, it is up to the competent institutions to assess whether they fall within ordinary political debate or whether they justify a more in-depth examination in light of applicable law.
Beyond this controversy, the question also refers to the lasting role of control institutions. The credibility of public speech depends indeed on the ability of competent bodies to produce regular, readable, and indisputable findings to inform democratic debate.
Postscript:
The new President of the Court of Auditors ticks all the boxes, making his appointment a consecration of his long and rich career within this institution. However, he is a transition president (he has less than three years before retirement), but above all a mission president. He must therefore meet four challenges. The first is regularity in the publication of annual reports. The second is the completion of the reform of the Court of Auditors to align it with international standards. The third is to open the institution to technical professions (petroleum, gas, infrastructure engineers, expert accountants, public health doctors), to rely on the internal skills pool through the implementation of a career plan for auditors within the institution, to help highlight the Court’s major achievements, and especially to open up to citizens for a better understanding of the Court’s missions and activities. Finally, the fourth concerns strengthening the professionalization of the Court’s professions (certification of accounts and evaluation of public policies).
