In late June 2026, Libreville will welcome a team of international experts sent by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Their task is to evaluate the measures Gabon has implemented to prevent corruption and recover illicit assets, as part of the second review cycle of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). This event may not make headlines, but ignoring it would be a serious mistake. For those committed to the fight against corruption—including supporters of the Democratic Socialist Front—this assessment is a personal and national challenge.
What is the real level of corruption in Gabon?
The evaluation, scheduled from 29 June to 1 July 2026, is a peer-review mechanism conducted with Chad and Libya. It will scrutinise Gabon’s progress in meeting UNCAC obligations, which the country ratified in 2007. The focus of this second cycle is twofold: preventing corruption and recovering stolen assets. The first cycle (2010–2015) centred on criminalisation and judicial cooperation.
What concrete actions have been taken?
As early as June 2024, serious questions were already being raised about the effectiveness of the National Commission for the Fight against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (CNLCEI). Less than a year after the Liberation Coup of 30 August 2023, the body meant to actively fight corruption and track down those who had illicitly enriched themselves under the fallen regime seemed largely useless—just as it had been under the old government. The transition had not transformed the institution. Even today, many Gabonese wonder about its purpose. What assets have been recovered? Who has been prosecuted?
On 11 July 2025, a workshop to promote the Code of Ethics was held in Libreville, bringing together institutions and partners to strengthen public integrity. Yet the effectiveness and application of this code remain unclear. On 27 February 2026, two new rapporteurs of the CNLCEI were sworn in before the Court of Cassation in Libreville, in line with legal requirements. This suggests the institution is functioning and renewing itself—a positive point. But since that swearing-in, their actions have remained invisible, and results are still awaited.
On 13 May 2026, the CNLCEI, with support from the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF), held a forum at its headquarters on “good governance, sharing best practices, and institutional strengthening for public integrity.” This shows a genuine desire to equip the CNLCEI with training tools and align its work with international standards. However, does it feel like “good governance” is truly shared across the public administration? Good governance is not measured by the number of workshops or official statements. It is measured by real reductions in corruption, punishment of abuses, recovery of embezzled funds sent abroad, and the trust citizens place in their institutions. This is the real test for Gabon’s new authorities.
Be fair, but lucid
It is fair to say that some things are being done, and it would be dishonest to deny them. Since the transition, the CNLCEI has seen its powers expanded; new constitutional provisions enshrine transparency in public resource management; and asset declaration mechanisms have been extended to more civil servants. In Vienna, at the 17th session of the UNCAC Implementation Review Group, the Gabonese delegation, led by Séraphin Ondoumba, presented the country’s progress: better inter-administrative coordination, adoption of UNODC instruments as tools for public accountability, and a multilateral cooperative posture based on mutual trust and technical dialogue.
However, it would also be lucid to note that these developments remain scattered measures without an overall architecture. That is the central problem: Gabon still lacks a proper national anti-corruption plan. There is no integrated strategy, no quantified roadmap, and no independent monitoring and evaluation mechanism. Instruments exist, but they operate in silos, without coherence or central steering. Public policy is not measured by the accumulation of texts, but by coordinated implementation and tangible results. The upcoming evaluation mission sends a positive signal, especially in a regional context where several states refuse to submit their systems to external scrutiny. But openness cannot substitute for a structured strategy.
What we must recognise with lucidity
Cooperating with evaluators and international organisations is a minimum. What is now expected is that Gabon demonstrates frank and transparent cooperation, laying bare the practices that undermine its administration so that it can be properly evaluated and receive relevant recommendations. International indicators remain worrying, and the country’s administrative culture—inherited from decades of tolerance for conflicts of interest, excessive sole-source public contracts (as the former Minister of Economy and Finance publicly acknowledged: “93.25% of contracts by value were awarded without tenders, i.e., by direct agreement”), and confusion between public goods and private interests—remains deeply ingrained.
Gabon still ranks in the lower half of global corruption perception indices (though it gained two points in Transparency International’s index since 2024). While oversight institutions exist formally, they still suffer from insufficient resources and independence that is too often theoretical. The judiciary is slow to handle some emblematic cases. And assets illicitly transferred abroad are not subject to any effective and transparent recovery mechanism. Must we conclude that Gabon is still lagging in the fight against corruption? The evaluation starting next week will provide the answer.
For our part, we are launching a mini-awareness campaign on corruption aimed at our fellow citizens this week.
