Mali’s war spills into diplomatic arenas
In Mali, a critical question now dominates the landscape: who truly maintains control on the ground, and at what cost to its civilian population? From the northern regions to the areas surrounding Bamako, the answer is not found in a clear-cut confrontation but rather in a complex web of rebel factions, jihadist groups, government forces, and external supporters.
The Malian conflict is far from new. Its roots trace back to the 2012 crisis, a period when the country’s north plunged into turmoil, caught between a Tuareg rebellion and expanding jihadist influence, all against the backdrop of a state collapse following the March 2012 coup d’état. Since then, the nature of the conflict has evolved, yet it has persistently endured.
The Malian army’s recapture of Kidal in November 2023 marked a significant symbolic turning point. This northeastern city, a long-standing stronghold for Tuareg rebels, represented a crucial shift in the balance of power. However, taking the city did not resolve the crisis; instead, it ignited a fresh wave of confrontations and retaliatory actions.
On-the-ground realities reveal escalating tensions
Since 2024, the situation has become even more severe. In September 2024, GSIM, a jihadist group with links to Al-Qaïda, claimed responsibility for attacks in Bamako, targeting areas near the Faladié gendarmerie school and the military airport. Subsequently, in spring 2026, a coordinated offensive struck multiple sites across the country, reaching as far as the capital.
Concurrently, Malian authorities implemented a series of emergency measures. In early June 2026, they prohibited the sale and use of large motorcycles outside major urban centers and established military zones off-limits to civilians. The stated objective was to complicate attacks by mobile groups, which frequently strike swiftly before disappearing.
For residents, the impact was immediate: travel became riskier, the local economy faced constraints, and access to humanitarian aid grew more challenging. The UN Human Rights Office warned in May 2026 that the situation was rapidly deteriorating, with civilians being killed, displaced, and cut off from food and assistance following the coordinated assaults.
The core issue remains military. The Malian junta seeks to reassert territorial control, while armed groups aim to wear down the state. Jihadists endeavor to destabilize the government, and Tuareg rebels continue to advocate for the autonomy or independence of Azawad, their northern region. Though their ultimate goals differ, these two agendas occasionally align on the battlefield against Bamako.
Ukraine-France controversy: accusations, denials, and power dynamics
This is where the political narrative becomes muddled. In 2024, the Malian junta accused Ukraine of backing Tuareg rebels after a heavy defeat of Malian forces and Russian mercenaries near Tinzaouaten. Kyiv refuted these allegations, stating that Bamako had provided no evidence. The Azawad Liberation Front also denied receiving any Ukrainian assistance.
The junta later leveraged this incident to harden its rhetoric against Ukraine and its allies. However, based on available information, it does not support the assertion that France is “in the same camp” as the jihadists. On the contrary, publicly known official French positions focus on supporting Ukraine and ending defense cooperation with Bamako, a decision that followed the Malian authorities’ denunciation of military agreements in 2022.
France, for its part, gradually reduced and then ceased its military presence in Mali after the breakdown in relations with the junta. This created a security vacuum that Bamako attempted to fill by turning to Russia, initially through Wagner and subsequently with successor Russian military arrangements. This strategic choice bolstered the Malian authorities’ sovereignist discourse but failed to halt the insurgency.
Assessing the winners and losers
The junta achieves political gains when it frames the crisis as a war against external adversaries and foreign conspiracies. This interpretation allows it to consolidate national discourse, justify security restrictions, and unify its supporters. Yet, it fails to address local divisions or the pervasive daily insecurity.
Tuareg rebels benefit when they demonstrate the capacity to reclaim territory in the north. Their movement also capitalizes on the void left by the departure of MINUSMA and the weakening of international security structures. However, their tactical, often unstable, alliances with jihadist groups tarnish their image and cause concern among local populations.
Jihadists, ultimately, thrive on chaos. They do not need to conquer Bamako to exert influence. Their primary objectives are to exhaust the state, expand insecurity along key routes, and demonstrate the junta’s lack of comprehensive control. Experts and recent assessments indicate that they are now striking far beyond their original strongholds.
For civilians, the toll is the heaviest. Residents of the north endure constant fighting, displacement, and the pervasive fear of reprisals. In Bamako, the 2024 attacks shattered the perception of a protected capital. And the security pronouncements of 2026 underscore that the Malian state remains largely on the defensive.
What to monitor next
The upcoming questions extend beyond military considerations to the diplomatic sphere. Close attention must be paid to the evolving relationships among Bamako, Kyiv, Moscow, and various West African capitals, as well as the junta’s actual capacity to contain the offensives of GSIM and Tuareg rebels. The future will reveal whether Mali enters a period of fragile stabilization or faces yet another escalation.
