An unprecedented look into the covert operations of Moroccan diplomacy and intelligence has come to light. A collection of confidential communications, dating back to October 2008 and originating from the Moroccan Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, unveils how Rabat masterminded an intricate strategy of infiltration and diplomatic counter-offensives. This initiative aimed to destabilize the Polisario Front and curb Algerian influence across Central America, leveraging crucial intelligence provided by Sahrawi diplomat Salama Ould Hennane.
Addressed directly to Yassine El Mansouri, the head of the DGED (Direction Générale des Études et de la Documentation — Morocco’s external intelligence service), these dispatches, bearing the signature of Ambassador Dr Brahim Housseine Moussa, illuminate profound tribal rifts within the separatist movement and significant geopolitical shifts, particularly in Panama.
Rguibatte vs. other tribes: leveraging tribal divides to weaken Polisario
Central to these revelations is a golden opportunity seized by Rabat: the potential defection of high-ranking Polisario officials. The Moroccan Ambassador detailed multiple approaches by a certain M. Sliman, identified as Salama Ould Hennane. A native of Dakhla, belonging to the Oulad Dlim tribe, Sliman previously served as the ‘ambassador’ for the SADR in Panama and across Central America.
Sliman’s assessment was stark: a “very strong discontent” was unsettling the separatist movement. The primary cause? Blatant favoritism shown by the Polisario leadership exclusively towards the Rguibatte tribe, at the expense of other tribal components, including the Oulad Dlim, Oulad Tidrarine, Ait Lahcen, Ait Baamran, and the Takna confederation.
According to the former separatist diplomat, this presented an opportune moment to deliver a decisive blow to the movement:
“This is the ideal moment to undertake action within the Polisario, to further weaken it and unite the movement’s opponents around the autonomy project.”
Sliman asserted that he had secured the agreement of several prominent SADR figures to establish an internal opposition faction. These individuals included:
- Ahmed ould Souilem (Minister Delegate for Arab Countries).
- Mahfoud Ould Ahmed Zine (former minister and military regional commander).
- Mansour (former Foreign Minister and representative in Paris).
The audacious plan presented to the DGED proposed that these personalities officially form an opposition group, publicly declare their dissent at an international press conference (likely in Madrid), and openly announce their support for the Autonomy Project put forth by Morocco. Ambassador Moussa further suggested to his superiors that Sliman be utilized as an “infiltrated agent” to execute this destabilization effort.
The battle for central america: Algeria’s financial leverage
Beyond internal power struggles, the letters expose a fierce proxy war for influence between Rabat and Algiers across Latin America. In October 2008, Moroccan diplomatic channels intercepted intelligence indicating that a high-level Algerian delegation, led by Algeria’s Ambassador to Washington, M. Baali, was preparing for a tour of Central American nations.
Algiers’ objective was clear: to undermine the progress of the Moroccan autonomy plan, which had been presented to the United Nations. To sway Latin American capitals, Algeria deployed a comprehensive strategy, offering a “package of cooperation projects”—effectively, financial and economic aid—in exchange for alignment with separatist ideologies. Concurrently, the Polisario dispatched its envoy, Mohamed Yaslem Beissat, to Panama in an attempt to mend internal divisions.
Panama’s strategic shift
Panama emerged as a critical focal point in this diplomatic standoff. The documents confirm a significant cooling of relations between Panama City and the separatists. Panamanian authorities refused to accredit a new SADR ambassador, effectively downgrading Sahrawi representation to the lower rank of a mere “chargé d’affaires.”
In response to this development, the Moroccan Ambassador urgently alerted Rabat: Panama expected a reciprocal gesture. The diplomat strongly advocated for Morocco to dispatch an official emissary to solidify this bilateral rapprochement and decisively block Algerian maneuvers.
In a final lobbying effort, the Moroccan diplomat disclosed that he had activated his trusted networks within the Panamanian government to obstruct Polisario’s requests. He delivered a thinly veiled threat: any reversal by Panama “could jeopardize bilateral relations with the Kingdom of Morocco.”
Mohamed Abdelaziz’s confidential itinerary
Demonstrating the precision of the intelligence gathered by the embassy, a document from October 27, 2008, meticulously detailed the upcoming schedule of the then-Polisario chief, Mohamed Abdelaziz. His itinerary included a visit to New York on November 4 for a meeting with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, followed by a trip on November 9 to Valencia, Spain, for the conclusion of the European Conference of Support for the Sahrawi People (EUCOCO).
These diplomatic archives thus lay bare the stark reality of the Sahara conflict: a clandestine struggle where North Africa and Latin America converge, and where the strength of alliances is forged as much in the private chambers of embassies as it is on the battleground of tribal rivalries.
