In Niamey, the Confederation of Sahel States (AES) recently marked a significant institutional step with the inauguration of its Parliament. However, beneath the surface of this apparent structural development lies a fundamental question: can credible regional integration truly be forged without genuine democracy, political pluralism, and an authentic popular mandate?
The symbolism in Niamey was carefully chosen. Towards the end of August 2026, representatives from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger officially established the confederal Parliament of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This new body comprises forty-five deputies, fifteen from each nation, and is tasked with contributing to the Confederation’s framework. These parliamentarians have already ratified their internal regulations and set up three specialized commissions focusing on defense and security, diplomacy, and development.
On paper, the vision appears compelling: three nations, having departed from ECOWAS, endeavoring to construct their own shared institutions. Official statements suggest this Parliament is intended to embody renewed sovereignty and foster Sahelian integration.
Yet, a troubling question persists: who do these deputies genuinely represent?
An architectural resemblance to ECOWAS
The paradox is striking. After criticizing ECOWAS as an organization detached from its people and lacking sufficient sovereignty, the AES appears to adopt several of its institutional mechanisms: a confederal structure, common political bodies, and now a Parliament designed to address issues relevant to the populations of member states.
The comparison becomes particularly disquieting when examining the parliamentary structure.
The ECOWAS Parliament, with its 115 seats, aims to represent the community’s populations. ECOWAS has articulated a goal of directly electing its parliamentarians through universal suffrage. In current practice, its members have primarily been designated from the national assemblies of member states.
The AES, conversely, introduces a Parliament with 45 members, with fifteen allocated to each of the three countries. While quantitative, the underlying principle remains similar: to create a regional assembly dedicated to advancing integration.
Thus, the true divergence lies not so much in the architecture itself, but rather in the origin of political legitimacy.
And this is precisely where the core issue resides.
A Parliament without popular elections?
The confederal Parliament of the AES emerges from three nations currently governed by military powers that seized control through coups d’état: Mali since 2020-2021, Burkina Faso since 2022, and Niger since 2023. The transitions, initially presented as temporary, have extended indefinitely, with the prospect of a return to normal electoral processes remaining uncertain. International IDEA highlights that military transitions in these three countries have persisted for several years.
In Burkina Faso, the situation offers a particularly revealing insight. The military government has indefinitely postponed elections and progressively curtailed political freedoms. In April 2026, Ibrahim Traoré publicly urged Burkinabè citizens to
