The silence that has returned to the streets of Niamey should not deceive anyone. The battle may be over, but the political war is only beginning.
In the night of 28 to 29 August, Nigerien soldiers attempted to overthrow the regime of General Abdourahamane Tiani. The attack, launched in part by troops from units deployed on various fronts across the country, targeted strategic installations in the capital, notably Air Base 101 and areas near the presidential palace.
For several hours, the power structure wavered. To save it, Tiani had to call on his Russian allies.
Members of the Africa Corps, the successor to the Wagner Group in Africa, intervened alongside Nigerien loyalist forces, participating in the recapture of the air base and the neutralisation of the mutinous soldiers. The Nigerien army, with the backing of Russian paramilitary forces, regained control of the base.
This is the major political fact of this crisis: Nigerien soldiers were fought on Nigerien soil with direct support from Russian forces who came to protect the regime that emerged from the 2023 coup.
Yet the junta had made national sovereignty its primary argument for expelling French and American forces.
Sovereignty with a double standard
For years, Tiani and his supporters told Nigeriens that the French military presence was a humiliation and an affront to national sovereignty.
The French soldiers left. The Americans were asked to leave the country. Western military agreements were denounced. The regime’s propaganda could then proclaim that Niger had finally regained its full independence.
But an embarrassing question now arises: what is the point of chasing out the French military if, a few years later, the government has to call on Russian troops to save the presidential chair?
The question is all the more explosive because the Russians did not intervene to defend Nigerien territory against jihadist groups. They intervened to help the government repel Nigerien soldiers who threatened the regime.
The symbolism is devastating.
Nigerien soldiers have been dying for years in the war zones of the Sahel. They fight against the Islamic State and JNIM, suffer heavy losses, and regularly denounce their combat conditions. The Niamey mutiny appears to have been fuelled precisely by the frustration accumulated in units that face jihadist violence on a daily basis.
And when these same soldiers finally turn against the government, it is the Russians who come to fight them.
What sovereignty remains when the national government can no longer ensure its own survival without foreign protection?
The growing rift between Tiani and his army
The mutiny of 29 August is probably the most serious warning sign sent to Tiani since he came to power.
The problem is not only that soldiers attempted to overthrow him. The problem is that they were able to do so when Niger officially has a considerable security apparatus. Above all, the unrest seems to have found fertile ground within the ranks of the regular army itself.
Soldiers deployed on the front lines bear the heaviest cost of the war. They see their comrades fall, they face material hardships, and they see jihadist attacks continue despite the junta’s promises.
Since 2023, Tiani has promised to restore security and give Niger back its dignity. Three years later, jihadist violence remains a major threat, and Nigerien forces continue to suffer significant losses.
In this context, part of the army seems to be questioning whether the regime has lost touch with those who are actually fighting on the ground.
The Russian intervention may have turned this frustration into hatred.
A Nigerien soldier can accept dying to defend his country. He can accept deprivation and sacrifice in the name of the homeland. But it will be much harder for him to accept that foreigners come and fire at him to protect a political regime.
Tiani, from Bazoum’s overthrower to Moscow’s protégé
The historical paradox is dizzying.
In July 2023, Tiani seized power claiming he wanted to save Niger from a political system that was incapable of guaranteeing the safety of its citizens. He overthrew Mohamed Bazoum, a democratically elected president, pretending to put an end to the failure of civilian rule.
Today, three years later, his own government needs foreign fighters to withstand a military revolt.
The trajectory is hard to ignore.
Tiani came to power through a coup. He now stays in power thanks to a security apparatus of which an essential component is Russian.
In other words, the man who claimed to free Niger from foreign tutelage seems to have swapped a Western dependency for a Russian one.
It is precisely this contradiction that could become the regime’s Achilles heel.
What if Bazoum had accepted French help?
Let us also go back to July 2023. When Tiani overthrew Mohamed Bazoum, France still had more than a thousand soldiers in Niger. Paris supported the elected president and was considering, under certain circumstances, an operation to help secure his release.
Bazoum’s close associates had asked for French intervention. According to information reported at the time, an operation was considered, but Bazoum ultimately preferred dialogue and refused to have French soldiers intervene directly.
That decision now belongs to history.
But one question remains: if Bazoum had accepted French intervention, would Tiani have succeeded in his coup?
No one can rewrite history with certainty. But it is perfectly legitimate to note that Tiani benefited from this hesitation. The elected president remained a prisoner in the presidential palace while the junta gradually consolidated its control over the state apparatus.
The most ironic part is that today, the man who denounced the French presence in Niger calls on a foreign power to save his own government.
Algeria enters the picture
As if the Russian presence were not enough, Algeria has just taken a new step.
After the attempt to overthrow Tiani, Algiers deployed military assets to Niamey, including combat and transport aircraft. This decision marks a significant shift in Algerian doctrine, which for a long time was marked by reluctance to commit its forces beyond its borders.
Algeria ultimately did not have to fight the mutineers: they had already been pushed back with the help of Russian forces.
But the message was clear: Tiani would no longer be alone.
Moscow protects the regime militarily. Algiers now provides strategic support. And the junta can present this encirclement as proof that Niger has new allies.
But behind this show of force lies an unsettling question: how many foreign powers will be needed to protect a government that seems to be gradually losing the support of part of its own army?
Volcano under the barracks
The 29 August mutiny may therefore not be an isolated incident. It could be the first symptom of a much deeper fracture.
Russian weapons allowed Tiani to win a battle. They did not address the frustrations of Nigerien soldiers. They did not destroy the jihadist groups. They did not bring back the soldiers who died at the front. They did not reconcile the troops with the government. They simply allowed the regime to survive a first attempt at overthrow.
And that is precisely where the danger lies for Tiani.
A regime can control a palace with foreign help. It can retake a military base. It can arrest mutineers. But it cannot indefinitely govern against an army that is beginning to see its own power as dependent on a foreign power.
General Tiani should therefore look beyond the walls of his palace. The real danger for his regime is perhaps not in Paris, Washington, or even the Western capitals he regularly accuses of conspiring against him. It could be right in the Nigerien barracks.
And if the soldiers who saw their comrades fall under the bullets of foreign forces one day decide to settle scores with those they accuse of handing their country to Moscow, the next mutiny could be much harder to contain.
The Russians can protect Tiani. Algeria can offer support. But no foreign power can eternally replace the loyalty of a national army.
Tiani’s regime may have won the battle of 29 August. But it may have lost something far more precious: the trust of a part of those who wear the Nigerien uniform.
