The Africa Corps, Moscow’s latest military deployment in Mali, is recalibrating its tactics by pulling troops away from the northern regions to safeguard the capital and the ruling junta while providing aerial support and intelligence to Malian forces on the ground.
«The shift reflects a deliberate effort to avoid unnecessary casualties,» explains Benedict Manzin, a senior Middle East and Africa analyst for Sybiline Intelligence. «Their priority is minimizing personnel losses while maximizing operational impact.»
The Africa Corps took over from the controversial Wagner Group in mid-2024 after Wagner suffered heavy losses in an ambush by the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) near Tin Zaouatine, close to the Algerian border. With roughly 2,000 personnel—many former Wagner fighters—the Africa Corps remains significantly smaller than the French Barkhane counterterrorism force, which the Malian junta expelled in 2022.
The fall of Kidal to the FLA and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) in late April appears to have been the tipping point for the Africa Corps’ strategic retreat. Instead of engaging in costly ground battles, the unit has focused on reinforcing Bamako, launching retaliatory airstrikes on Kidal that destroyed critical infrastructure and forced civilians to flee. These strikes were intended to bolster the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), which now spearhead operations in the north.
«They’re leaning heavily on air power,» notes Manzin. Recent operations have included the use of Russian-made cluster munitions in Kidal, violating Mali’s commitments under the international ban on such weapons. «They can’t afford to waste resources on small skirmishes where they might lose fighters,» he adds.
Analyst Jacob Boswall, tracking the Africa Corps’ public communications, highlights a clear pivot toward central and southern Mali. Most operations are now concentrated near Bamako, with over 500 propaganda posts on Telegram and other platforms following the defeat in Kidal.
Beyond airstrikes, the Africa Corps has also stepped in to break economic blockades imposed by the GSIM. Russian fighters and air support now escort supply convoys entering landlocked Mali from Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Senegal, shielding them from GSIM attacks.
Meanwhile, the GSIM has adapted by deploying drones to target Russian positions. Recent social media footage shows drone strikes on Africa Corps bases in Sévaré, with images of destroyed aircraft and killed fighters. In response, the Africa Corps has launched its own drone strikes, including a recent attack on a GSIM fuel depot in Tombouctou, according to Africa Terrorism Tracker analysts.
Since late 2021, Mali has spent nearly a billion dollars on Wagner and the Africa Corps. Yet, despite this investment, the government and its Russian allies have lost control of northern Mali, while the GSIM has expanded its influence across the Sahel. «Mali’s strategy is backfiring,» warns Manzin. «Brutal tactics against civilians have driven communities into the arms of extremists, undermining long-term stability.»
