The Central African Republic (CAR) has endured persistent instability since 2004, when a devastating three-year civil war engulfed the nation, followed by years of sustained conflict against various insurgent groups. Seeking to restore stability, the government extended an invitation to Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group in early 2018, initially for training purposes.
By 2019, over 1,000 Wagner mercenaries were operating within the Central African Republic, strategically embedding themselves across the nation’s political, economic, and social structures. Their focus quickly shifted to key sectors such as gold and diamond mining, alongside timber extraction. This infiltration fueled the rise of a conflict economy, where these mercenaries and other factions systematically profit from the country’s perpetual disorder.
Wagner operatives not only infiltrated local markets through coercion and intimidation but also firmly established a foothold within President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s administration, notably by positioning a Russian national as a senior security advisor.
In 2021, a joint military initiative by Wagner and government forces swept across the country. Though presented as a stabilization campaign, it evolved beyond counter-insurgency into a broader endeavor aimed at territorial, political, and economic consolidation.
Presently, the combined efforts of government and Wagner forces have reshaped the Central African Republic’s economy. What once sustained rebel groups has now been transformed into networks that bolster the Touadéra government and generate wealth for Russia.
Local elites, supported by foreign security partners, aligned armed groups, and various economic actors, have reportedly leveraged coercion and organized crime to consolidate power, seize control of resources, and advance their financial agendas. This dynamic has effectively transformed the Central African Republic into a hub for powerful transnational criminal networks. Other nations, including the United Arab Emirates, Rwanda, and Turkey, also exert influence within the country.
The involvement of Russian mercenaries is undeniably transactional. Their expanding presence aims to integrate security, economic, and political control over natural resources, ultimately serving to secure Russia’s long-term influence in the region.
With Russian backing, President Touadéra has solidified his political authority. Concurrently, Wagner-affiliated personnel and their allies have become deeply embedded within crucial ministries, security agencies, customs administration, and the strategic resource sector. Far from delivering stability, both Bangui and Moscow have instead entrenched and formalized systems of coercion, extraction, and predation.
Government successes against armed groups have not eradicated the “conflict rapacity” observed in mining, trade routes, and taxation. Instead, these predatory practices have been redirected towards government-linked actors, networks, and individuals who now exploit these various sectors.
Notably, Russia has significantly profited from the gold and fuel trade within the Central African Republic. Wagner has established an “illicit fuel supply chain” to fund both its joint military operations with the government and its extensive mining activities.
The sheer scale of Wagner’s involvement in the Central African gold trade has been surprising. The “blatant mass and volume of gold extracted from the country” is particularly striking. Wagner-controlled interests are estimated to produce approximately 5 tonnes of gold annually.
This extracted gold holds an export value of around $250 million, yet its worth on the international market can readily climb to $500 million.
Since 2021, Russian and Rwandan forces have reportedly recaptured vital mining regions across the country, effectively dislodging armed groups from their control over these territories. Consequently, a greater volume of artisanally mined gold has been channeled through official export channels. Gold exports reached 1.7 tonnes in 2023. While projections for 2025 anticipated total exports of approximately 2.5 tonnes, the actual figure by year-end had surged to 7 tonnes.
This export volume “significantly surpasses the capacity for artisanal production,” strongly suggesting the inclusion of industrially sourced gold, most likely originating from Wagner’s concessions.
While the security arrangement between Russia and the Central African Republic presents a somewhat distinctive model on the continent, Russia’s broader ambition to control African resources, particularly gold, is not unique. Russian forces have reportedly acquired over $2.5 billion worth of African gold between February 2022, marking Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the close of 2023.
Russia’s aggressive pursuit of gold primarily targets the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan. Wagner has secured exclusive rights to the Ndassima mine, the largest in the Central African Republic. Furthermore, Russia controls a significant refinery and stands as the “primary buyer of unprocessed Sudanese gold” within Sudan. In Mali, Russian mercenaries reportedly receive millions of dollars in cash monthly from the ruling junta, which heavily relies on gold mining companies for the bulk of its tax revenue. This intricate system circumvents international sanctions, which are evaded through “complex smuggling routes and commercial concealment tactics” across the Central African Republic and Sudan.
