Eighteen months following the military takeover in Niamey on July 26, 2023, the ambitious pledges of a national “Refoundation” and a radical break from past practices appear to be faltering when confronted with the realities of oil sector governance. At the very core of the state’s power structure, the newly appointed Petroleum Minister, Hamadou Tini, faces allegations of holding multiple, conflicting roles, disregarding fundamental ethical principles. Operating as both judge and advocate, the former senior executive from the Mazars firm is now reportedly leveraging state authority to reactivate contracts for his private entity, demanding unfettered access to the sensitive operational data of the Société de raffinage de Zinder (SORAZ). This report delves into a profound conflict of interest at the highest echelons of government, where financial oversight has seemingly been repurposed as a tool for political maneuvering and personal gain.
From reform rhetoric to the resurgence of influence
Immediately after seizing power, the military leaders of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) championed economic sovereignty as their paramount objective. The primary target for this reform was clearly identified: the management of Niger’s petroleum resources, particularly focusing on the SORAZ refinery. State television broadcasts at the time featured putschist propaganda vehemently denouncing the ousted democratic system and its perceived international “accomplices.”
Among those publicly discredited was Mazars, an international consulting firm that had partnered with the Nigerien state for a decade. The new regime, alongside its Chinese partners from the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), accused Mazars of producing biased audits, leading to the firm’s emphatic rejection. It seemed Mazars was definitively banished from Niger’s economic landscape. The official government stance was uncompromising: Niamey would engage a neutral, independent, and irreproachable international firm to conduct a thorough examination of SORAZ’s operations.
However, behind the scenes, the pervasive influence of established networks quickly undermined initial public optimism. Through a series of intensive lobbying efforts, a prominent figure from Mazars successfully infiltrated the state apparatus. By January 2026, under the direct patronage of General Mody, the accomplished accountant Hamadou Tini was elevated to lead the Ministry of Petroleum. This appointment signified an undeniable comeback for the very firm he had served just weeks prior.
Minister Tini: client, service provider, and signatory
No sooner had Hamadou Tini settled into his ministerial post than he reportedly acted on the popular adage, “charity begins at home.” Exercising the authority of his office, the minister promptly reinstated the financial and management audit of SORAZ. Yet, this maneuver came with a non-negotiable stipulation: this highly strategic assignment had to be exclusively entrusted to his former firm, Mazars, ostensibly to allow it to “finalize its work and receive payment.”
This contractual re-engagement elevates the concept of a conflict of interest to an almost unprecedented level. The Petroleum Minister finds himself simultaneously in several roles: the client, issuing the audit order on behalf of the Nigerien State; the service provider, executing the mission through his affiliated firm, Mazars; the ultimate recipient of the audit reports; and finally, the sole signatory authorizing public funds to remunerate the service.
This convergence of responsibilities completely compromises the Nigerien State’s guarantee of independence. How can an auditing firm objectively assess a public enterprise when its own mentor and former senior executive holds the ministerial portfolio responsible for that very entity?
The contentious directive: a rush for confidential documents
The assertion of power does not end with the signing of contracts. With the future of the transitional government remaining uncertain, time is evidently of the essence for Minister Tini’s inner circle. The minister has recently issued a definitive directive—an unquestionable order—to the management of SORAZ.
Through a ministerial decree, Hamadou Tini demands that Mazars receive, “without delay or restriction, the entirety of financial, accounting, technical, and operational documents, within eight days.” These are precisely the strategic and highly confidential data that the refinery’s management and its Chinese partners had previously steadfastly refused to release, citing the imperative to protect business secrets.
In Niamey, local observers frequently invoke another piece of popular wisdom to encapsulate the current situation: “He who has peered through the keyhole already knows what lies on the table.” With his intimate knowledge of SORAZ’s accounting vulnerabilities from his previous role, the minister is acutely aware of where to focus his scrutiny to achieve his objectives.
The enigma of the sacrificed ministers
This forceful reassertion of control over SORAZ casts new light on the persistent instability that has plagued the Ministry of Petroleum since the coup. In a mere three years, three different ministers have occupied this critical strategic position. This rapid rotation of leadership appears intrinsically linked to the closely guarded secrets of the Zinder refinery.
Before Hamadou Tini’s arrival, Minister Mahaman Moustapha Barké had grandly announced, in June 2024, the initiation of a comprehensive financial audit of SORAZ. Just months later, on January 13, 2025, he was arrested and held in secret by the Directorate General of Documentation and External Security (DGDSE). This clandestine detention lasted nearly a year, entirely outside any judicial process, until his release on January 6, 2026. His successor, Dr. Sahabi Oumarou, hastily appointed, also attempted to restart the audit in February 2025 before being swiftly removed from his post.
Today, consistent reports from within the sector accuse Hamadou Tini of having played an active role in the downfall of his predecessors. While still an expert with Mazars, he allegedly authored carefully crafted, incriminating memos and reports designed to discredit the management of both Barké and Oumarou to the ruling junta. The underlying strategy was twofold: to eliminate any obstacles to Mazars’ return and to sculpt the ministerial position for a perfectly suited candidate—himself.
“Refoundation” under scrutiny
The SORAZ affair starkly exposes the deep-seated contradictions inherent in the Niamey regime. As the Nigerien population endures the severe economic fallout of diplomatic isolation and continues to await the promised benefits from the nation’s oil wealth, the resources from this “black gold” appear primarily to be serving specific corporate interests.
The audit of SORAZ, initially championed by civil society as an act of transparency and public accountability, has regrettably devolved into an instrument of internal power struggles. In the hands of the minister-auditor, it functions simultaneously as a shield to obscure conflicts of interest and as a financial conduit for his original firm. For the “Refoundation” promised by the CNSP, the assessment is grim: the management practices surrounding Nigerien oil have not fundamentally changed; only the beneficiaries have been altered.
