The Spanish Foreign Minister has recently leveled an unprecedented accusation against the country’s main opposition party, the Partido Popular (PP), labeling it as “anti-Moroccan”. This sharp critique comes amid escalating tensions that have spilled beyond typical political rivalries into the realm of foreign policy.
José Manuel Albares argues that the PP is converting Spain’s external affairs—particularly its relationship with Morocco—into a tool for domestic political confrontation. Recent statements and controversies from current and former party leaders have intensified these frictions, with the minister going so far as to call the opposition an “obstacle” to Spain’s diplomatic strategy.
Yet beneath this political clash lies a far more intricate reality. Since 2022, Spain and Morocco have cultivated a robust strategic partnership spanning migration, economics, trade, security, and now the joint organization of the 2030 FIFA World Cup with Portugal. In December 2025, the two governments solidified this alliance with fourteen new cooperation agreements and a joint declaration to deepen political dialogue.
If the PP secures power, it will inherit this carefully built relationship. The question remains: how will it handle it?
the western Sahara dilemma
The Western Sahara issue stands as the most contentious unresolved challenge. When Pedro Sánchez endorsed Morocco’s autonomy plan as “the most serious, credible, and realistic basis” for progress in 2022, the PP seized on this shift as a key point of contention against the government.
Alberto Núñez Feijóo, then PP leader, condemned the decision as a rupture with decades of bipartisan foreign policy consensus, citing the lack of prior consultation with the opposition. Since then, the party has maintained a deliberately ambiguous stance. While its official documents emphasize respect for international law and UN resolutions, they stop short of echoing the government’s explicit support for Morocco’s autonomy initiative.
This ambiguity is not new. Under Mariano Rajoy’s leadership, Spain maintained a cautious posture without outright opposition to Morocco’s proposal. The PP has also hosted divergent internal factions—some advocating for a strategic partnership with Rabat, others aligning with separatist positions.
The contradictions reached a peak in July 2025 when a self-proclaimed Polisario representative attended the PP’s national congress, sparking controversy and fueling Moroccan skepticism about a potential Feijóo government.
Tensions escalated further in February 2026 when Albares accused the PP of operating with a double discourse: publicly criticizing the government’s stance on Western Sahara while privately dispatching “emissaries” to Morocco to quietly endorse the same position they condemned in public.
For the PP, the stakes are clear. While opposing the government’s Western Sahara policy from the opposition is one thing, reversing course upon assuming power would carry significant diplomatic consequences. The party has yet to provide a definitive answer: would an Feijóo-led government uphold Spain’s current position or revert to the pre-2022 doctrine? So far, the party has avoided a clear response.
shifting political winds and nationalist rhetoric
The Western Sahara dispute is not the only source of friction. Recent months have seen the PP adopt a tougher stance on immigration and access to public benefits, driven by intensifying electoral competition with Vox.
A defining moment came in April 2026 when the concept of “national priority”—long associated with the far right—entered Spain’s political lexicon. Vox pushed the idea of prioritizing nationals over foreigners in accessing certain public services, a notion later adopted in regional political agreements.
This forced the PP to clarify its position amid internal divisions. Some party members warned of the legal and political risks of embracing a term tied to far-right ideology. Jaime de los Santos, a senior PP figure, sought to distance the party from the concept, stating that “all legal immigrants have exactly the same rights as those born in Spain.” Others framed the debate around “residential anchoring” or “priority for residents.”
Yet the damage was done. Vox has succeeded in pushing its agenda into the mainstream, and the PP now faces the challenge of balancing its electoral strategy with the realities of governance.
the pragmatism trap
The central paradox facing the PP is this: as an opposition party, it can leverage Morocco and Western Sahara to criticize Pedro Sánchez’s government. But as a potential ruling party, it would inherit one of Spain’s most critical and complex international relationships. The two positions are not always compatible.
Should Feijóo enter La Moncloa, he may discover that many of the policies he has criticized are rooted in strategic necessities that no Spanish government can ignore. Cooperation with Morocco is not merely an ideological choice of the PSOE—it is driven by geography, economics, security, and a growing web of shared interests.
The most likely outcome is not a rupture but a contradiction between opposition rhetoric and government action. The PP may find itself preserving the core of the current relationship with Rabat, forced to explain to its base why it has not reversed decisions it once condemned.
Albares’ accusation about the PP’s alleged secret diplomacy in Morocco underscores this tension. The party may prove far more pragmatic in private than its public discourse suggests.
The fundamental question is not whether the PP is “anti-Moroccan,” as the foreign minister claims. It is how far the party is willing to weaponize its relationship with Morocco for electoral gain—and how much of that rhetoric it would actually translate into state policy if given the chance to govern.
Spain remains Morocco’s closest European neighbor, and Rabat remains a vital strategic partner for Madrid, regardless of who holds power. The contradictions within the PP are significant precisely because they highlight the gap between campaign promises and the demands of statecraft.
If Alberto Núñez Feijóo becomes prime minister, he will not inherit a blank slate. He will take charge of a profoundly transformed bilateral relationship, a Spanish position on Western Sahara embedded in a new international reality, a consolidated security cooperation framework, and a 2030 World Cup that will require close collaboration with Morocco in the years ahead.
The choice facing him will be stark: either implement the opposition discourse as government policy—risking a new period of uncertainty with Rabat—or acknowledge that the relationship with Morocco demands a pragmatism the PP has not always been willing to acknowledge publicly. This decision could become one of the first major foreign policy tests for a potential Feijóo administration.
