Following the synchronized assaults on April 25 and 26 targeting key Malian locations such as Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré, and Kidal, a previously unspoken question has re-emerged in Mali’s security discourse: should direct talks be initiated with jihadist organizations? Given the significant scale of the offensive, jointly executed by the Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Jnim), an Al-Qaïda affiliate, and the Tuareg rebel faction, the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA), numerous analysts and observers now contend that a purely military approach is proving insufficient.
The offensive swiftly extended from northern to southern Mali with unprecedented speed. These armed factions launched multiple coordinated strikes against military forces and governmental symbols across at least six cities, reaching the outskirts of Bamako. Notably, this marked the first time the Jnim and the FLA visibly collaborated in such operations. Established in November 2024 following the dissolution of the Permanent Strategic Strategic Framework (CSP), the FLA advocates for the self-determination of Azawad, a vast region in northern Mali.
These recent assaults starkly highlighted the Malian regime’s fragility. Neither the junta led by Assimi Goïta nor its Russian partners, Africa Corps, appear capable of halting the advance of these armed groups. Within regional media and diplomatic circles, the possibility of engaging in negotiations with the Jnim is now being openly discussed, fueled by the gradual strangulation of Bamako and the broader regional entanglement. Despite this, the junta publicly dismisses any notion of dialogue, asserting its unwavering commitment to a strictly military response, even as the security situation rapidly deteriorates.
Nevertheless, since late April, the pressure on the regime has intensified relentlessly. Violence has escalated significantly across the country’s central regions. Just recently, on Friday, several villages in the Bankass area, including Kouroude and Dougara, endured attacks. Local and security sources indicate that the combined death toll from Wednesday’s and Friday’s assaults ranges between 70 and 80 fatalities.
An unprecedented alliance, a critical warning
The Jnim remains the primary catalyst behind the jihadist expansion across the Sahel, particularly impacting Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. For the military juntas comprising the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), the predicament is tightening. Having seized power with promises to restore security, these regimes are struggling to curb a threat that continues to proliferate. In Mali, for nearly a year, attacks have been drawing inexorably closer to the capital.
Alain Antil, director of the Sub-Saharan Africa Centre at Ifri, observed, « Starting in July 2025, jihadists launched attacks in western Mali, targeting gold mining and industrial sites. They subsequently focused on the Bamako-Dakar corridor, effectively stifling the capital. » Héni Nsaibia of Acled further analyzed, « What is striking this time is not merely the magnitude of the operation, but also the deliberate selection of targets. Kati and Bamako represent the very core of the regime. »
The demise of Defense Minister Sadio Camara in Kati profoundly destabilized the government. Concurrently, the recapture of Kidal in late 2023, initially hailed as a significant triumph, now represents a major strategic reversal.
The strategy of suffocation
Even prior to this recent offensive, several experts had noted an evolving strategy within the Jnim. Alain Antil previously explained, « There’s a clear intention to forge a stronger power dynamic, not solely through security pressure, but also to compel Malian authorities into negotiations. »
The jihadist group now aims to replicate its localized tactics on a national scale: implementing economic blockades, progressively encircling urban centers, and exerting pressure on vital logistical arteries. The researcher emphasized, « The Jnim is actively attempting to sustain an economic blockade around Bamako. »
According to Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, this strategy is conceived for the long haul: « They have opted to undermine the government from within, favoring a strategy of protracted entanglement and leveraging the military system’s inherent weaknesses. » He further noted, « The Jnim no longer insists on the strict application of Sharia law as a precondition for peace and has indicated a willingness to engage in negotiations. »
In this complex landscape, the ongoing rivalry with the État islamique au Grand Sahara (EIGS) introduces an additional layer of instability, as both groups strive to expand their territorial control and influence.
A taboo option becomes unavoidable
Officially, the Sahelian regimes consistently reject any notion of dialogue. Alain Antil observed, « For the leaders of the AES, political negotiation is not on the table. Their rhetoric remains confrontational, presenting military action as the sole viable option. »
However, the reality on the ground is considerably more intricate. Atrocities committed by state forces and their allies have severely eroded public trust. Between January 2024 and March 2025, approximately 1,500 civilians were killed by governmental forces and their Russian partners in Mali, a figure nearly five times higher than those attributed to the Jnim, according to the GI-TOC. This pervasive violence exacerbates resentments and inadvertently facilitates jihadist recruitment.
States must commit to a brave compromise.
Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, Sahel specialist researcher
Faced with this stalemate, an increasing number of experts are advocating for a fundamental shift in approach. Alain Antil of Ifri asserted, « A purely military option is a dead end against the jihadist phenomenon in the Sahel. It absolutely must be combined with political negotiations. » He suggests that certain grievances articulated by jihadist groups – such as corruption, demands for justice, and access to resources – could potentially form a basis for discussion, without, however, downplaying the violence they perpetrate.
Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa takes this perspective further, stating, « States must commit to a brave compromise. The underlying idea would be to integrate jihadists into the political arena to expose their limitations. » Nevertheless, he established clear boundaries, emphasizing, « The principles of gender equality and the secular nature of the state are non-negotiable. »
As jihadist offensives continue their advance, the concept of negotiation is transforming from a heresy into a viable political hypothesis. For many specialists in Mali, the pertinent question is no longer whether dialogue should occur, but rather how much longer Bamako can realistically avoid it.
