Since their ascent to power, the military administrations governing Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have anchored their political discourse on a decisive break from the established regional order and a vocal critique of traditional international partners. The formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) is a direct manifestation of this strategy, aiming to redefine alliances and assert national sovereignty.
However, three years following the initial coups, a clear assessment emerges: security challenges remain pervasive, economies continue to face considerable strain, and public expectations are still remarkably high. Within this context, the prevailing political narrative appears increasingly reliant on identifying external adversaries rather than presenting concrete outcomes of domestic policies.
A sovereignty project
The sovereignty-focused rhetoric of the AES has resonated significantly with segments of the Sahelian populations. After years of frustration stemming from persistent insecurity and a perceived ineffectiveness of certain international collaborations, the concept of fully reclaiming control over diplomatic and military decisions found fertile ground.
Yet, true sovereignty is not merely measured by the denunciation of agreements or the shifting of alliances. Fundamentally, it is assessed by a state’s capacity to guarantee its citizens’ safety, generate employment, attract investment, deliver efficient public services, and sustainably improve the living conditions of its people.
On these crucial indicators, the challenges confronting these nations remain substantial.
The persistent appeal of the scapegoat
When a government struggles to produce rapid, tangible results, political communication frequently becomes a vital tool for mobilization.
In the case of the AES, criticisms directed at certain neighboring countries or regional organizations feature prominently in public discourse. Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, is often portrayed as a hostile actor or a conduit for foreign interests.
This strategy can offer an immediate political benefit: it fosters unity around the ruling power by identifying a common adversary. Nevertheless, it also carries several limitations.
Firstly, it tends to divert attention from the everyday concerns of the populace: insecurity, youth unemployment, rising living costs, difficulties in accessing education, and inadequate infrastructure.
Secondly, it risks exacerbating unnecessary diplomatic tensions between countries whose economies and populations remain deeply interconnected.
Finally, it can gradually diminish the scope for democratic debate by equating any internal criticism with support for external enemies.
Côte d’Ivoire prioritizes diplomatic continuity
In response to regional tensions, Côte d’Ivoire has consistently maintained a diplomatic stance rooted in dialogue and stability.
This approach draws from a longstanding tradition inspired by Félix Houphouët-Boigny’s policies, which emphasized mediation, economic cooperation, and the pursuit of consensus.
Despite occasional verbal attacks, Abidjan generally avoids escalation. This choice is driven by both diplomatic considerations and economic interests.
Côte d’Ivoire remains a primary commercial outlet for Sahelian nations. Its port serves as a strategic infrastructure for the imports and exports of several landlocked states. Trade, private investments, and the movement of people create an interdependence that no political rhetoric can easily erase.
Millions of citizens from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger reside, work, or operate businesses in Côte d’Ivoire. A prolonged deterioration of bilateral relations would, therefore, have human and economic repercussions far exceeding immediate political considerations.
Diplomatic rupture and economic consequences
A confrontational strategy also carries an often-underestimated economic cost.
Regional tensions can impede investment, complicate trade, increase logistical expenses, and diminish the attractiveness of the affected countries to international investors.
Political uncertainty typically represents a major risk factor for businesses.
In economies already weakened by security challenges, a proliferation of diplomatic crises can thus exacerbate financing difficulties, slow job creation, and hinder growth.
The risky gamble of new partners
Another cornerstone of the AES strategy involves diversifying international alliances, notably through a pronounced rapprochement with Russia.
While diversifying partnerships is a sovereign right recognized for all states, this diversification does not automatically guarantee economic or security improvements.
International experience demonstrates that no single external partner can, by itself, resolve structural issues such as weak institutions, insufficient productive investments, rural poverty, or territorial governance.
The inherent risk is merely replacing one form of dependence with another without addressing the underlying causes of the difficulties encountered.
Genuine strategic autonomy primarily necessitates strengthening national institutions, professionalizing security forces, improving the business climate, diversifying the economy, and investing in human capital.
Pervasive communication, awaited results
The AES authorities place significant emphasis on political communication centered on sovereignty, resistance, and national reconquest.
While this communication helps to strengthen patriotic sentiment, it cannot sustainably substitute for the tangible results expected by the populations.
Citizens primarily evaluate their leaders based on concrete criteria:
- A sustainable improvement in security;
- A reduction in the cost of living;
- Employment opportunities for youth;
- Functional schools and health centers;
- Modern infrastructure;
- Inclusive economic growth.
In the long term, these indicators will carry more weight than slogans or communication campaigns.
West Africa’s need for cooperation over division
Recent history in West Africa illustrates that the region’s major challenges—terrorism, transnational crime, migration, climate change, food security, and economic development—transcend national borders.
No single state can overcome these challenges alone.
Regional cooperation, whether within existing organizations or through new partnership frameworks, therefore remains an essential lever.
Transforming neighbors like Côte d’Ivoire into permanent adversaries risks further weakening a region already grappling with multiple crises.
Conclusion
The Alliance of Sahel States emerged from a desire to break away from a model its leaders deemed ineffective. This ambition aligns with genuine aspirations held by a segment of the population.
However, a rupture in itself does not constitute a public policy.
Ultimately, the credibility of the AES will be judged less by its sovereignist declarations and more by its capacity to concretely enhance security, revitalize the economy, safeguard public liberties, and strengthen regional cooperation.
The future of the Sahel will hinge less on identifying external culprits and more on its leaders’ ability to produce tangible results, restore citizen trust, and transform regional dialogue into a tool for stability rather than a perpetual arena for confrontation.